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Abstract 
Structural variables have been incapable of providing a fully satisfactory answer 
to why multilateral conferences can fail one year but succeed the next. Scholars 
focusing on the role of the presidency have been more successful, but a sole focus 
on the presidency, which comprise one part of an organizational process, might 
give us a partial understanding of the procedural dynamics in place. The process 
of international climate negotiations consists of regular meetings, relationships 
and common rules, routines and norms: similar to an archetypal organization. 
With an organizational perspective, new insights into why multilateral 
negotiations fail or succeed are disclosed.  
Through a qualitative approach, comparing the subsequent climate negotiations 
in Copenhagen and Cancun, including first-hand interviews, a systematic review 
of official documents and second-hand sources, a clear picture of what happened 
is depicted and analyzed. Findings show that the normal working process had 
been altered in Copenhagen due to special circumstances. Furthermore, the 
alignment between process managers was superior in Cancun, which fostered a 
high level of diplomacy and expertise. Finally, transparency in the process can 
generate trust and a more efficient negotiation process. This thesis shows that an 
efficient organizational process increases the probability of a successful outcome. 
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1 Introduction  
On the 10th of December 2010, at the 16th Conference of Parties of the United 
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancun, the 
negotiating parties reached consensus on a legally binding agreement, which was 
immediately followed by a spontaneous round of applause from negotiators and 
observers who saw this as a successful outcome (ENB, 2010). The Cancun 
Agreements reignited the UN-led negotiation process, with vital enhancements on 
especially finance and transparency. It was a sharp contrast to the outcome of the 
previous conference, the 15th Conference of Parties in Copenhagen, which 
gathered 115 heads of state and 40.000 participants but failed to produce any legal 
outcome (ENB, 2009). The Copenhagen Accord is a vacuous political declaration 
of three pages that was written by a handful of parties (Dimitrov, 2010). Despite 
the accord’s lack of content it did not pass the plenary: parties “took note” of it. 
Multilateral climate negotiations have a universal membership and a consensus 
decision-making rule, which make the process very complex. Our understanding 
of how the organization behind this process affects the probability of an outcome 
is still at a basic level.   
The 15th Conference of Parties in Copenhagen had higher expectations yet better 
preconditions than the succeeding 16th Conference of Parties in Cancun, with two 
years of preparatory negotiations and with unprecedented mitigation commitments 
made prior to the conference (Dimitrov, 2010, p. 19). Even though, the Cancun 
Agreements were more robust, and consequently more sensitive for the 
negotiators, it passed the plenary. The two conferences constitute a pivotal time in 
the brief history of international climate negotiations and it is critical we fully 
understand the reasons behind the differences in outcome. Therefore, the research 
question of this thesis is:  
 
Why did the international climate negotiations fail in 2009 but succeed in 2010? 
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   How is it possible to explain the outcome of a complex decision-making 
process? It is something that scholars have argued over since long before the 
dawn of climate change negotiations. Most frequently used are the structural 
International relations theories: Neo-realism (power), Liberal institutionalism 
(interest and institutions) and Constructivism (norms) (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 
2011). However, none of them can really explain the difference in outcome 
between Copenhagen and Cancun: changes within them were insignificant 
between 2009 and 2010. More successful have the process-based approaches, 
focusing on the role of the presidency (or chairmen), being at disentangling this 
puzzle. However, the president is just one part of a dynamic organizational 
process and must be considered in relation to other elements of the organization.   
This main argument of this thesis is that the organizational process is a central 
variable, which can provide valuable insights into the dynamics of multilateral 
processes. Every actor, involved in these processes, is part of an organization: 
governments, the United Nations or stakeholders. Together they form a bigger 
organization with the aim to produce a climate agreement, which is the main 
reason for them to arrange conferences and negotiate. The UNFCCC process 
shares many characteristics with a typical organization: regular meetings (several 
times annually), common actors, rules, routines and even norms. Naturally, these 
organizational elements have some effect on actors’ behavior. From an 
organizational perspective, the outcome is no longer the result of rational 
bargaining but an organizational output. The process becomes central.  
Two conferences are compared, and analyzed, with the help of three sub-
variables: (i) organizational culture, (ii) alignment between process managers and 
(iii) transparency. The organizational culture enables a more efficient process in 
the short term: common rules, routines, and norms enable actors to be confident in 
how they and other actors will behave. A good alignment between the process 
managers can generate a smooth process through a high level of expertise and 
diplomacy. Finally, transparency can generate a higher degree of trust among the 
participants, which is a key to consensus. With an organizational perspective, this 
thesis offers a new level of understanding to why multilateral conferences fail and 
succeed.   
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2 The Organizational Process  
This section outlines the theoretical groundwork. It begins with an introduction of 
interrelated findings. In sub-chapter 2.1, you will find a description of Allison’s 
Organizational Process Model including key assumptions and concepts. After that in sub-
chapter 2.2, Allison’s Bureaucratic Model is portrayed and in sub-chapter 2.3, you will 
find a section on transparency. Finally, in sub-chapter 2.4, some causal mechanisms are 
specified.      
 
Almost 200 countries tried to reach consensus in both Copenhagen and Cancun. 
Climate change is a very sensitive issue; both action and inaction can have severe 
consequences on countries’ domestic realities. Furthermore, both the causes and 
effects of climate change are unevenly distributed over the world (Chasek et al. 
2010, p. 179). The UNFCCC negotiation process has grown every year since the 
first Conference of Parties in 1995, it has developed its own set of rules, routines, 
and culture. Most negotiators meet two-three times annually in weeklong official 
negotiations and they interact in-between in workshops and in informal meetings. 
Naturally, the participants have also developed relationships with each other 
(Chasek, 2011, p. 92). Scholars often assume that the organizational process is a 
homogenous variable, which this thesis is demonstrating that it is not.   
The organizational process is an often overlooked variable. Although, Joanna 
Depledge’s (2005) work is a great exception: the author extensively describes the 
role of the organization in international climate negotiations. The author 
convincingly argues that the organization has a bigger impact on the process than 
what most scholars tend to believe. The author maps out some key organizational 
elements in the process of multilateral climate negotiations: (i) rules for the 
conduct of business and decision-making, (ii) use of different arenas for 
negotiation and discussion (iii) timing of the negotiations (such as when to best 
implement a new negotiation text) and (iv) rules for high-level participation (Ibid, 
pp. 4, 14). The author’s main conclusion is that the organization matter and should 
be considered.  
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Inspired by Depledge’s work, I am elaborating the understanding of the 
organizational process by building on Allison’s Organizational Process Model 
and his Bureaucratic Model. They both provide valuable insight into how an 
organizational decision-making process works. Since the two models share the 
same basic assumptions, they can be used together. As Wagner wrote, ”It is not 
entirely clear whether Model III [referring to the Bureaucratic Model] is 
independent of Modell II [referring to the Organizational Process Model] or an 
extension of it” (Wagner, 1974 in Bendor & Hammond, 1992, p. 302). Both see 
the outcome of a decision-making process as an organizational output.  
The biggest difference between a governmental decision-making process and a 
UN-led negotiation process is the need for consensus. Therefore, in order to make 
Allison’s organizational models more compatible with the reality of multilateral 
conferences, a couple of theories on how to build consensus have been included. 
This approach differs from Depledge’s in mainly two ways. First, this thesis is 
more focused on how the organizational process affects the probability of a 
successful outcome. Secondly, this thesis includes the role of transparency. 
Additionally, Depledge’s work is already ten years old, and the climate regime 
has shifted a lot since her work was published.  
Variation in the process has mostly been explained by the role of the presidency. 
Jonas Tallberg (2003) shows in his work how the presidency impacts 
policymaking within the European Union. The author shows that the president can 
shape the agenda in three ways: through (i) agenda settings, (ii) agenda structuring 
and (iii) agenda exclusion. Siwon Park (2011) analyzes climate negotiations and 
illustrates that the presidency is a key variable in explaining the outcome. 
Monheim (2013) further develops this idea and argues, in his dissertation, that the 
authority and capability of the president have a positive effect on the probability 
of an outcome. By merging the perspective of organizations with the role of the 
presidency an improved understanding might entail. Monheim and Park have an 
explanatory ambition in their work, but according to my understanding their 
explanatory variable is too limited. As Depledge (2005) shows, the presidency is 
just one part of a broader organization. 
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2.1 The Organizational Process Model  
Central assumptions in this theoretical approach have been extracted from the 
Organizational Process Model, described by Allison & Zelikow (1999, ch. 3) in 
their book Essence of Decision. Since the model primarily aims to provide insight 
into a governmental decision-making process, it is necessary to adjust it for this 
new type of organization. Needless to say, every detail or concept included in 
Allison’s model is not used or considered in this thesis. However, following the 
central idea of Allison’s Organizational Process Model: the decision-making 
process is understood as an organizational procedure.  
  Some key concepts are helping us understand how actors, in this model, are 
taking decisions. First of all, the organizational process constraints rationality. In 
other words, actors perceive problems through “organizational sensors”: they are 
bounded rational. (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 156). This does not mean that 
actors are not powerless, rather they are rational agents taking the best possible 
decision, based on their place in the organization and upon the available 
information. Since, multilateral climate negotiations are complicated in terms of 
multiple processes, interdependent issues and multiple actors (Depledge and 
Chasek, 2012, pp. 19-37 or Sjöstedt and Penetrante, 2013, pp. 4-34), the 
assumption that actors are bounded rational must be regarded as a modest one.   
Since the organizational process involves many actors, complex tasks and 
diffuse issues, there is a need for standard operating procedures: “rules according 
to which things are done” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 143). Related to this, 
March and Simon (1993) write that there are two different logics of action: a logic 
of consequences which is similar to the realist assumption of actors’ behavior, and 
a logic of appropriateness which assumes that actors are matching rules to 
situations (March and Simon, 1993, p. 8). In other words, actors are following 
standard operating procedures and primarily conduct actions that are expected of 
them.  
The organizational culture is another key concept that shapes both actors and 
the process. The authors write, “organizational culture emerges to shape the 
behavior of individuals within the organization in ways that conform with 
informal as well as formal norms” (Ibid, 1993, p. 145). The individuals that work 
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with these issues daily consist of a limited number of negotiators and secretariats. 
They meet 3-4 times a year officially (UNFCCC, 2015), and together they have 
developed a set of formal and informal rules, routines and relationships: an 
organizational culture. Ravasi and Schultz (2006, p. 434) develop on this and 
write, “Shared understandings are the results of sensemaking processes carried out 
by members as they interrogate themselves on central and distinctive features of 
their organization”. On external events they write: ”External occurrences that 
challenge an organization’s claims are likely to trigger responses aimed at 
countering identity-threatening events” (Ibid, 2006, p. 435). Extracted from these 
theories, the process works more efficiently in the short run without external 
events altering its organizational culture.  
Since routine is a main element of the organizational process, it might be 
necessary to define it further. Sidney Winter defines routine as “pattern of 
behavior that is followed repeatedly” (Winter, 1964, p. 263 in Becker, 2004, p. 
644). Routines provide a level of stability in an organization with many actors. 
Becker writes that routines can be understood as cognitive regularities. The author 
also writes, “routines would then be understood as rules” (Becker, 2004, p. 645), 
which is what Allison & Zelikow refers to as standard operating procedures. 
Gittell, who analyzes the performance effect of routines, concludes, “routines 
work by enhancing interaction among participants, which was found to have a 
positive performance effect” (Gittell, 2002 in Becker, 2004, p. 655). Routines can 
also help actors to cope with uncertainties and increase stability (Becker, 2004, p. 
658-659). Routines can mitigate uncertainty, provide stability and enhance 
interaction among actors in organizations with many actors.   
2.2 The Bureaucratic Model 
A related theory focuses more on how different organizational divisions interact. 
In can be viewed as an extension of the Organizational Process Model, since it 
basically divides the organization into divisions: “Separate institutions share 
power” (Ibid, 1999, p. 255). A central assumption is that divisions within the 
organization do not just collaborate: they compete over power and influence. 
Allison & Zelikow write, “outcomes are formed, and deformed, by the interaction 
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of competing preferences” (Ibid, 1999, p. 255). This model is primarily used, in 
this thesis, to understand the alignment between process managers.    
 Actors represent their own division, consisting of a specific set of goals, norms 
and personal objectives (Ibid, 1999, pp. 255-256). When explaining a certain 
decision-making process, it is necessary to map out the “circle of central players”. 
The alignment between these actors depends on the different actor’s perception, 
preferences and stands on the issue at hand (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 298). 
Allison & Zelikow develop some ideas on what shape actor’s perception, 
preferences and stands on a certain issue: (i) the answers to questions of ”what is 
the issue” and ”what must be done” depend on where in the organization the actor 
is sitting, (ii) actors have different goals and (iii) actors’ stands are depending on a 
balance between different interests (Ibid, 1999, p. 298-299).  
 According to the model, an effective leader must generate support among the top 
circle of actors (Ibid, 1999, p. 260). Even if the president is the most powerful 
actor, this individual needs support from other actors within the organization, in 
order to provide to implement efficient decisions. The social motivation, to 
implement a decision they do not agree with, is naturally lower than the opposite. 
For different divisions to be able to cooperate efficiently, they need to have 
similar objectives and cultures.  
 Some argue that this model is ”too complex” (see Bendor & Hammond, 1992, p. 
318). Understandingly so, an organization can be divided into competing 
divisions, which in turn can be divided into competing sub-divisions and so on. In 
order to solve this problem just two levels are being analyzed: (i) the top level 
consists of the process managers’ organizations (the host government and the 
UNFCCC Secretariat), while the second level consists the top players within these 
organizations. Furthermore, since UNFCCC is an external convention within the 
United Nations umbrella, their relationship with the United Nations Secretariat is 
also examined. Two levels of analysis are needed, in order to understand the 
overall alignment. The next sub-chapter focuses on how the organizational 
process can increase the probability of consensus.  
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2.3 Organizing Space for Consensus  
This part further elaborates the understanding of the organizational process by 
including theories on consensus building. Pamela Chasek (2011, p. 92) describes 
the central characteristics of climate negotiations: the need for an attainment of 
consensus. She writes that a key characteristic is that, “abstention is an affirmative 
rather than a negative vote”. Meaning, if a negotiating party is not actively 
opposing a proposed text, it will pass. Furthermore, she writes, “Consensus 
involves […] an endeavor to reach a compromise that will be reasonably 
acceptable to all” (Ibid, 2011, p. 92). The consensus rule also puts a high pressure 
on parties to accept the proposal in the 11th hour to avoid the blame from the other 
parties.      
An effective organizational process must achieve procedural equity and 
transparency without losing too much efficiency. Depledge (2006, pp. 80-82) 
writes that many of the central rules in the UNFCCC process have been created to 
secure transparency and equity. Examples of these are (i) the consensus rule, (ii) 
one-party-one-vote rule (i.e. equal say), (iii) the rule that says documents shall be 
circulated in advance and (iv) the right to speak. These rules are not specific for 
the UNFCCC process: rather they are common for most negotiations under the 
UN umbrella. Depledge notes that countries can use these rules as a strategy when 
they want to protract the negotiations. She writes ”It is similarly not uncommon 
for some parties to seek to delay the negotiation process more generally by 
insisting on procedural adherence” (2006, p.84). It is not uncommon that parties 
complain over transparency, but their real purpose might be a different one.  
A decision, based on consensus, requires political will from most parties. In the 
article, The Dynamics of Consensus Building in Intracultural and Intercultural 
Negotiations, the authors find that “consensus building […] depends on the 
epistemic and social motivations of the individual negotiating” (Liu et al, 2012, p. 
269). Social motivation is something that the organizational process can generate 
through transparency. If actors feel excluded, their motivation for reaching 
consensus, and thus makes sacrifices, will logically decrease.    
In the article, Transparency in the WTO’s Decision-Making, the author describes 
the importance of transparency in the World Trade Organization’s decision-
  9 
making process, which also requires consensus. The WTO has made their process 
more transparent in order to build trust between developing and developed 
countries (Delimatsis, 2014). The dynamics of the WTO and the UNFCCC 
processes are similar in central aspects: with historical injustices and a low level 
of trust between developed and developing countries.  
This chapter has outlined the theoretical ground of this thesis. Allison’s 
Organizational Process Model is the foundation from where the key understanding 
of how actors, and a group of actors, act. Key concepts such as standard operating 
procedures, bounded rationality and organizational culture have been described 
and discussed. The Organizational Process Model is complemented with a basic 
understanding of the Bureaucratic Model. The basic understanding is that different 
divisions have diverse goals, processes and cultures. The quality of the alignment 
between different divisions have an effect on the process and thus also on the 
probability of an outcome. Finally, in order to make the model more compatible 
with the reality of multilateral conferences, a section on how to reach consensus 
was included. The next chapter outlines plausible causal links that have been 
extracted from this theoretical background.   
 
2.4 Causal Mechanisms  
From this theoretical foundation, it is possible to draw some plausible inferences 
on how the organizational process affects the probability of a successful outcome. 
These mechanisms are, in the analysis, tested on the empirical evidence of what 
happened at the two conferences. The purpose of these mechanisms is to make the 
theoretical inferences testable and falsifiable. The first mechanism comes from the 
assumption that the working process is built on common rules, routines and 
norms. Following this, actors follow a logic of appropriateness and the process 
moves slowly and organically. The organizational process should, in the short 
term, gravitate towards solutions that limit short-term uncertainties in order to 
facilitate an efficient progress. An altering of the organizational culture might 
result in indecisiveness, due to a higher level of uncertainty. This would have a 
negative effect on the probability of an agreement.     
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Graph1  
 
The second mechanism focuses on the alignment between the process managers. 
Even if they manage the organizational process together, they have different 
organizational cultures, expertise and objectives. The quality of their alignment in 
facilitating a smooth process can affect parties willingness and ability to agree.  
 
Graph 2 
 
The third and final mechanism is retrieved from theories on how the 
organizational process can create space for consensus. Following the results from 
previous studies, the mechanism states that a transparent process can generate a 
higher level of trust between negotiating parties, especially between developed 
and developing parties, which in extension increases the probability of an 
agreement.  
 
Graph 3 
 
 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical foundation of this thesis. After the next 
chapter, which focuses on alternative explanations, the methodological approach 
is described. How these causal mechanisms are tested will be explained in this 
chapter (chapter 4).   
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3 Alternative Explanations  
This chapter is providing a short overview of alternative explanations. First, Neo-
realism, the power centered, approach is discussed. After that, the theories of Liberal 
institutionalism and Constructivism are portrayed. This chapter provides the reader with 
a general understanding of the most common explanations that are trying to explain the 
outcome of multilateral negotiations.      
 
The organizational process is far from the only conceivable explanation. Rather 
the probability of a successful agreement depends on several interdependent 
variables and this thesis argues that the organizational process is one of them. In 
other words, an efficient organizational process does not automatically generate a 
successful outcome. If all negotiators shared the same view, they would probably 
be able to agree with an inefficient process as well, but the probability would be 
even higher if the process was efficient. This chapter is encapsulating the most 
common explanations to why international climate negotiations fail or succeed. 
 Neo-realism bases its explanation on countries’ strife for power. This classic 
theory puts weight on the relative power distributions among states. States are 
considered the only interesting actor and they are assumed to take rational 
decisions (Rowlands, 2001, pp. 43-45). Most realist theorists argue that the main 
reason for countries to participate in negotiations is to increase their own relative 
power, while others argue that it is the hegemonic power that is the most 
interesting variable (Ibid, 2001, p. 44). A hegemonic power in a non-military 
context is most often defined by economic power, where the hegemonic power 
can steer other states through economic pressures and incentives. Following this 
theory, if the United States and China support an agreement, it will have a good 
chance to be implemented. Some neo-realists argue that relative gains are the 
most interesting factor. One example of this is the study by Vezirgiannidou 
(2008), which shows that the perceived “China threat” was a key factor for the 
United States to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Showing that the United States did 
not want to lose any relative power to China.  
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Inescapably, power is an essential variable in explaining international climate 
negotiations, but merely focusing on power entails some problems. First of all, the 
struggle for power cannot explain why negotiations fail one year, but succeeds the 
next (the power balance was more or less unchanged). Secondly, the actors at 
multilateral conferences rarely have complete information and it can be 
problematic to assume that they take fully rational decisions. What information 
the actors have at hand depends to a great extent on the organizational process.  
However, the negotiations during 2009 and 2010 were indeed colored by an 
(economic) power struggle between the United States and China: the two 
countries with the world’s biggest economies and largest greenhouse gas 
emissions. A key task of the conference was to get the United States on board, and 
thus not repeat the Kyoto Protocol situation, which would have made the new 
agreement toothless (Meilgaard, 2010). From a power perspective, this would be 
almost impossible due to the differentiated responsibilities between the two 
UNFCCC annexes. An agreement would require bigger efforts from the United 
States than from China. For example, the question if the new transparency system 
should be unitary (same for all countries) or binary (based on if the existing 
annexes) became a central question in Copenhagen and Cancun (Park, 2011). If 
this theory can explain why the negotiation in Copenhagen failed, it cannot 
explain why the same parties reached consensus in Cancun.  
Power, as a variable cannot either explain why countries engage in transparency 
negotiations, where countries must reveal sensitive information and where the 
gain cannot be understood in relative power or gains. However, hegemonic power 
can explain several specific outcomes such as: (i) the timing for the planned 
momentous agreement in Paris 2015, which is taking place at the last possible 
year of Barack Obamas presidency and (ii) why the parties are discussing a five-
year commitment cycle (UNFCCC, 2015a, p. 21), which is not consistent with 
either the UNFCCC reporting cycles (four and two years) or the IPCC cycle (six 
year) but consistent with China’s five-year plans. But as Oran Young (1989, p. 
374) concludes “power theorists overemphasize the role of preponderant actors or 
hegemons”. Finally, the simplistic nature of the model is over-looking crucial 
variables, such as the struggle for power are taking place within the organizational 
processes with all of its constraints.  
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Liberal institutionalism puts its focus on the interest, where the main argument is 
that institutions play a key role. According to the theory, an increasing 
interdependence between countries and the institutional regime set the frames for 
countries’ behavior. Institutions matter because they have an effect on available 
options, transaction costs and they can reduce uncertainties about how other actors 
will behave (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 34). The theory perceives anarchy in 
the global system as a problem because actors can “free-ride” on actions by other 
parties (O’Neill, 2009, p. 10). According to this theory, countries’ position in 
negotiations can be derived from their willingness to maximize their own gains. 
Rational liberal institutionalists often use game theory to describe how different 
countries position themselves. In short, institutions help actors to avoid the worst 
outcome through cooperation.  
A central negotiation topic in Copenhagen and Cancun was the scope of the new 
transparency system. What should be under the system and more importantly, 
who should assess countries’ internal affairs? China fiercely opposed any 
supranational verification, while the United States insisted on its importance. 
While interest and institutions can explain the need for a transparency system, it 
cannot really explain the difference in outcome between Copenhagen and Cancun.  
 Constructivism, on the other hand, focuses on how the international cooperation 
is shaped by international norms: “The key issue, however, is not whether 
identities matter but how they matter” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p.8). The 
authors also write “ideas define the universe of possibilities for action” and maps 
out three types of beliefs through which ideas can make a difference: worldview 
beliefs, principles (or normative) beliefs and causal beliefs (Ibid, 1993, p. 8-9). A 
key assumption in this thesis is that the organizational process shapes actors 
behaviors through settling what ideas that are considered possible. A key 
assumption is that a different organizational process would enable other ideas 
(and possibilities) and in extension a different final agreement. The organizational 
process model shares many similarities to Constructivism. Their main focus is on 
rules and how they set the game, although constructivism is more focused on 
informal rules and norms.  
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4 Research Design 
This chapter describes the research design. First, you will find a description of the 
overall methodological approach. Then, you will find a brief section on case selection. 
After that, you will find operationalization of the key variables together with some 
indicators. The final section provides a description of the data collection.  
 
The methodological approach consists of a qualitative comparison of two cases. 
These two cases are chosen because they ended differently and mark a pivotal 
moment in the short history of international climate negotiations. The 15th 
Conference of Parties has gathered a lot of interest from scholars since it was the 
biggest environmental negotiation to that point and many are puzzled by its 
outcome. The cases are analyzed and compared according to the logic of Mill’s 
method of difference (Mill, 1843). Two subsequent climate conferences, within 
the same regime, are being compared, which alleviate much of the problem of 
case heterogeneity. Due to the limited time-span of one year, the structural 
variables can be assumed to be constant. Thus, I am zooming in on the most 
interesting variable, which did change between the negotiations: the 
organizational process.  
4.1 Methodological Approach  
The purpose of this qualitative approach is to reach those mechanisms that easily 
can be missed with a broader tool. The organizational process, and its sub-
variables, are hard to quantify and thus often over-looked. Only because it is hard 
to measure does not mean that the impact of the organizational process is 
insignificant. As written, two cases are carefully compared. More concretely, the 
comparison zooms in on three vital parts of the organizational process, later 
referred to as sub-variables, which is done with the help of extracted indicators. 
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The purpose of this comparison is to reveal how the organizational process differs 
and how this difference affected the probability of an outcome.  
In the analysis, I am being guided by my hypothesized mechanisms. These 
mechanisms ensure that the analysis is analytical and not just descriptive. It would 
be optimal to find a variable in the causal mechanism that made the negotiations 
change in a new direction. However, it is unlikely to find a clear cut case like that, 
rather this approach allows me to say if the mechanism was in place it either 
increased or decreased the probability of an outcome. The next section describes 
the chosen cases and the selection procedure.  
4.2 Case selection 
Selecting cases within a small sample can be challenging task. So was it also for 
me. My first idea was to compare the organizational process over several cases 
(and regimes). Understandably, that turned out to be impractical since it would not 
be qualitative enough. It had not been qualitative enough and the mechanisms 
would maybe not have been visible. When I decided to conduct a comparative 
analysis of just two cases within the same process, I quickly decided to focus on 
the climate regime. It is where the core of my expertise lays and much due to the 
high stakes, I find it to be the most interesting process. If the organizational 
process had a significant impact in this negotiating process, it would then be likely 
that it has an impact on negotiation processes with lower stakes as well.   
My next step was to find two comparable conferences, with a difference in the 
independent variable. I finally decided to compare Copenhagen and Cancun, due 
to the stark contrast between them and their pivotal role in the long-term process. 
I also found it natural to put a bigger emphasis on part of the negotiations that 
focus on measuring, reporting and verification (i.e. transparency) of the parties’ 
actions, since it played a key role in the two conferences. It is an area of the 
negotiations that still receives little attention, despite its core role in the climate 
regime. As written, the conferences constitute a pivotal change in the climate 
negotiation process. Copenhagen had through its failure a major effect on the 
process, which can be seen as shifting from a top-down approach (with negotiated 
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emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol) to a bottom-up approach 
(with intended nationally determined contributions). Cancun was also a crucial 
negotiation since it agreed on a new transparency system, that elevated the level 
of transparency within the UNFCCC process to a new and more robust level: and 
thus enhanced the climate regime and its ability to affect the global level of 
emissions. 
4.3 Variables 
Graph 4 portrays an overview of the key variables explaining the probability of a 
climate agreement. Power, interest and norms, described in chapter 3, are 
capturing the general international relations theories. Besides them, I have 
included the organizational process, which is the main contribution of this thesis. 
Even if power, interest and norms cannot explain the difference in outcome 
between Copenhagen and Cancun they are still affecting the general probability 
and therefore included in the model. This section continues to elaborate on the 
deduced causal mechanisms and introduces central indicators to each sub-
variable.   
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The dependent variable of this analysis is the outcome. I am viewing the outcome 
of the two conferences in the most simplistic way: the conference in Copenhagen 
failed to produce an agreement while the conference in Cancun succeeded. Even 
if, the expectations were different, the non-agreed Copenhagen Accord would 
have been considered a failure in Cancun as well, while the Cancun Agreement 
probably would have been regarded as a moderate outcome in Copenhagen.     
The operationalization of the organizational process is more complicated. I am 
following Monheim’s approach (2013) and divide the main variable into three 
layers. The organizational process is the basic layer from which I have extracted 
three sub-variables, which form the second layer: (i) organizational culture, (ii) 
alignment of process managers and (iii) transparency. Again, it would be possible 
to focus on additional sub-variables but these are the most interesting from my 
understanding of the theoretical background and of international climate 
negotiations. For a theoretical background of these sub-variables, please see 
chapter 2.  
A third layer includes the indicators that shape the elements of the second 
layer’s process variables. For example, transparency in the process can be 
assessed through an examination of transparency in the procedural conduction of 
texts and in the selection of small-group negotiations, where the process of 
conduction of texts and the selection of small group negotiations become the two 
indicators. The indicators have been deducted from a qualitative reading of the 
theoretical material. In short, the indicators determine what the analysis is looking 
for, in order to assess if the sub-variables and in extension the organizational 
process had an impact on the outcome. The next section describes the first sub-
variable: the organizational culture.   
4.3.1 Organizational Culture  
Organizational culture is another qualitative concept that can be difficult to 
measure. Culture is not something that changes dramatically from one year to 
another. However, the culture can be more or less intact due to various reasons. 
Allison writes, “organizations create purposes and routines that arise from within” 
and “the rules both define and grow out of a distinctive organizational culture” 
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(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 153). My understanding of this, together with the 
theoretical foundation presented in chapter 2, is that the organization is an organic 
process that functions best in the short run without external interruptions. 
Therefore, in finding out how the organizational culture differs between the two 
conferences we need to analyze the central aspects of the organizational culture, 
therefore three key indicators have been extracted: 
 
(i) Visions among the negotiators of what the output from the conference 
shall be. As Allison and Zelikow (1999, p. 149) points out: “their goals 
[...] are often diffuse”. For a multifaceted organization, such as the 
multilateral climate negotiations, to be efficient their different working 
processes most work cohesively: striving for the same type of output (they 
will, of course, differ on its content). Many of the organization’s informal 
rules, routines and expectations depend on the organization’s central 
vision. For example, the logic of appropriateness depends on what is 
considered appropriate, which in turn depend partly on the vision. This 
parameter shall not be confused with external expectations: it simply refers 
to the internal vision of the organizational goal. 
(ii) Routine is a central part of the organizational culture. A central concept in 
this theory is standard operating procedures (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 
147), which basically proclaims that actors follow routines. In the short 
run, an efficient organization follows routines: actors know how to act and 
are confident in how other actors will act. Routines can generate stability 
and mitigate uncertainty (see chapter 2). However, for routines to be 
useful negotiators must meet situations that they are familiar with. 
(iii) The Presidencies cultural fit is another indicator specific, which is 
designed specifically for multilateral negotiations. Since presidencies 
come into the organization externally, their cultural fit might differ. Every 
host government has different culture, relationships and agendas. For the 
organizational process to work efficiently, the newly elected presidency 
and its team must have a good understanding of the existing culture. If the 
new president brings in a leadership un-fitted with the existing 
organizational process and its culture it might alter the organizational 
culture.    
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4.3.2 Alignment between Process Managers 
The process managers consist of an alignment between the UNFCCC Secretariat 
and the host country (who is responsible for the presidency). As managers of the 
negotiation process they, ”engage in both the procedural organization and 
[provide] substantive input aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the 
negotiation process” (Depledge, 2007, p.45). Even if both are mandated to 
impartiality, they have different routines, norms and goals. While the host 
government is involved for one year, the secretariat constitutes the backbone of 
the climate negotiation process. Their mandate also differs, the parties elect the 
president, while the secretariat consists of civil servants (Ibid, 2007, p. 46).   
The organizational willingness, and capability, within the host government to 
cooperate with the UNFCCC Secretariat varies from year to year. A possible 
alignment depends partly on the host government’s understanding of the 
UNFCCC process, but also on their understanding of how to push for progress 
efficiently. Secondly, it is necessary to look at the diplomatic choices made by the 
host government. Depledge (Ibid, 2007) writes that the president is “expected to 
proactively manage the negotiation process to promote a successful outcome”. 
From an organizational perspective the effectiveness of these actions, depend on 
the quality of their alignment with the secretariat. This entails two indicators:  
 
(i) Organizational Expertise. How well does the host country understand 
how the UNFCCC process work? For an organization to be efficient it 
must use all of its existing resources. As concluded by Allison & Zeikow 
(1999, p. 265), “More information and better analysis can produce better 
decisions”. Different divisions have different expertise and a good 
alignment can utilize the use of this expertise.  
(ii)  Organizational Diplomacy. As written, better alignment can produce 
better decisions, but Allison (Ibid, 1999, p. 260) also writes “power equals 
impact on the outcome”. At multilateral climate conferences, it is the 
presidency that has the last say on any major issue regarding the process. It 
is therefore necessary to analyze how these decisions were made. All other 
things being equal, a good alignment implies better decisions.    
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4.3.3. Organizing Space for Consensus  
As described in the chapter 2, a transparent process can increase the level of trust 
between actors. Transparency is analyzed through two key indicators of the 
negotiating process: the procedural conduct of the negotiating texts and the 
selection of negotiating arenas. These two are central parts of the organizational 
process and it is foremost through these, transparency can be ensured.   
It is generally wrong to talk about one negotiation: it is really multiple 
interdependent negotiations on different levels. The second indicator refers to the 
question of what constellations the negotiations are being conducted in? 
Negotiations can take place in the big plenary room with hundreds of negotiators, 
in small contact groups and behind closed doors. Discussions in smaller forums, 
such as contact groups or informal negotiations, are more effective, but their 
legitimacy can easily be questioned.   
”Text do not only reflect the status of negotiations, but can also help move the 
process forward” (Depledge, 2005, p. 164). Text can move the negotiations 
forward in two ways, (i) it makes progress in bargaining ”real” and (ii) text can 
work to facilitate more efficient negotiations through its ability to capture all the 
details and thereby allow negotiators to focus on the main issues. However, 
definitions of words and decisions are essential for the negotiators and an 
unequivocal definition can be left in order to find a common ground. The 
organizational process is responsible for an efficient text negotiation procedure 
and if needed push for consensus through the implementation of a compromised 
text.   
The presidents often draft their own negotiating text, often referred to as the 
Chair’s text. This is partly done to get a more workable text on the table but also 
in order to move the negotiations forward. One of the strengths of a Chair’s text is 
that it removes the feeling of ownership of paragraphs and words in the old text. 
For the Chair’s text to be successful, timing is an important factor. If it’s released 
too early it might interfere with the negotiation and generate uncertainty and 
distrust among the negotiators, if it is released too late there might not be 
insufficient time for bargaining.  
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(i) Procedural conduction of negotiating texts, to what extent is the text 
procedure transparent? Even if the president has decided to produce its own 
text, it can be a transparent decision.  
(ii) Procedural selection of negotiating arenas, in what arenas are the key 
negotiations taking place? To what extent is the informal negotiation 
transparent? A small group negotiation has a better chance if other parties 
know about its existence and is informed about crucial progress in these 
closed negotiations.  
4.4 Data Collection  
Climate negotiations are generally well documented. One of the core tasks of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat is to compile and publish documents on their website. This 
official documentation forms the base of the empirical material. However, since 
the organizational process is a qualitative variable, it is not possible to fully rely 
on official documents. Therefore, official documents consisting of web-cast of 
actual negotiations, different versions of negotiation texts and agreements and 
official statements have to be complemented with interviews and second-hand 
material.  
One central source is the newspaper Earth Negotiations Bulletin, operated by the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, the newspaper is generally 
considered to be an unbiased source of information. Social scientists (e.g. 
Widerberg & Laerhoven, 2014 - Bauer, 2009 – Busch, 2009), stakeholders and 
negotiators themselves frequently use this paper as a trustworthy source. 
Furthermore, a lot of researchers have already analyzed the events in Copenhagen 
and Cancun. It would be a mistake to not use the second-hand material available. 
The material also consists of qualitative interviews with three actors that were 
involved in the UNFCCC process: two Programme Officers from the secretariat 
and one central negotiator who participated in the two conferences. Since their 
contribution is pure informative the number of interviewees is not crucial. The 
interviews are informative interviews, which followed a few central question, but 
also allowed the interviewee to describe what happened from his/her perspective.  
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5 Analysis 
This chapter is structured into three sub-chapters. The first part looks at the 
organizational culture, the second part focuses on the alignment between process 
managers and the final part analyzes the role of transparency. However, first you will 
find a short overview of key events in international climate negotiations during 2009 and 
2010. 
 
The principal differences between negotiating parties were similar at the two 
conferences. United States insisted on the importance of transparency of action by 
developing countries, something that especially China resisted. The issue referred 
to what shall be measured, reviewed and verified, by whom and how often. (ENB, 
2009). A stronger transparency system forces parties to comply with their 
commitments. While the global share of developing countries’ emissions has 
increased every year, they have had no obligation, before the Cancun Agreement, 
to officially report on their emission levels. Developing countries on the other 
hand, wanted developed countries to take more responsibility and regarded 
ambitious financial and mitigation commitments as essential. For example, the 
Chinese negotiator said: “The developed countries are trying every means 
possible to avoid discussion of the essential issue — that is, emission reductions” 
(The Associated Press, 2010).  
The 15th Conference of Parties took place during two weeks in December 2009 
in Copenhagen. The conference gathered an unprecedented 40 000 participants 
that can be compared with the previous momentous climate conference in Kyoto, 
which gathered 9 000 participants in 1997 (Depledge and Chasek, 2012, p. 27). 
The conference gathered a huge public interest, with intense media coverage and 
demonstrations (ENB, 2009e, p. 4). The Danish organization officially invited all 
the ”Heads of State and Government to Copenhagen to close COP 15” 
(UNFCCC, 2009), which resulted in the participation of 115 government leaders 
(ENB, 2009, p. 1). Expectations of what the conference should produce were high.  
However, the negotiations at the conference moved slowly and due to the lack of 
progress the process managers initiated a “friends of the chair” group consisting 
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of 26 parties (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 131). Although, the decisive negotiation 
occurred within an even smaller group of countries: United States, Brazil, India, 
South Africa and China (Monheim, 2013, pp. 121-123: Meilstrup, 2010, p. 132). 
Barack Obama was first to announce the occurrence of an agreement, the 
Copenhagen Accord, to the media. 
 
“These three components -- transparency, mitigation and finance -- form the 
basis of the common approach that the United States and our partners embraced here in 
Copenhagen” 
      Barack Obama, December 18, 20091 
 
 
When the Copenhagen Accord was introduced in the plenary, it met a fierce 
opposition from several developing countries (ENB, 2009, p. 1): hardliners were 
the countries from the leftist Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America 
(ALBA) Group. The negotiators were not able to find consensus and the session 
ended with the parties ”taking note” of the Copenhagen Accord. Many countries 
criticized the lack of inclusion and transparency in the process (ENB, 2009, p. 7-
8). Countries that objected to an adoption of the accord were Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, Tuvalu, Cuba and Costa Rica. Their objectives can be divided into 
two categories: substantive objections and procedural objections. Substantive 
objections were raised by the small island state of Tuvalu who basically argued 
that the text was too weak (Tuvalu later gave the accord a “green light”, see 
Dimitrov, 2010). Procedural objections were raised by a number of countries and 
especially the legitimacy of the closed negotiation group was questioned (Müller, 
2010, pp. 14-16 – ENB, 2009).  
While being members of the major negotiation group, G77 and China, it would 
have been difficult for the opposing parties to reject the agreement without some 
silent support from more powerful countries (Meilgaard, 2010). China, Brazil and 
India did not make any statement during the final plenary, a signal of their 
disappointment with the outcome (Dimitrov, 2010, p.21). Even if the hard-liners 
came from the ALBA group, a main underlying reason was the lack of trust 
between developed and developing countries.  
                                                
1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-press-availability-copenhagen 
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In the aftermath of the 15th Conference of Parties, actors blamed the weak 
outcome on each other and on the process. G77 and China, consisting of the 
majority of developing countries, accused the United States to ”locking the poor 
into permanent poverty by refusing to reduce US emissions further” (Vidal, 
2009a). Bolivia, an ALBA member, blamed the Danish organization, “this is 
completely unacceptable. How can it be that 25 to 30 nations cook up an 
agreement that excludes the majority of the 190 nations?” (Vidal, 2009a). But also 
the whole UNFCCC process, and United Nation’s role in it was questioned. A top 
US negotiator, John Pershing, said, “the UN didn't manage the conference that 
well” and continued saying, “we are going to have a very very difficult time 
moving forward and it will be a combination of small and larger processes” 
(Pershing in Goldenberg et al, 2010). Statements like this opened for a greater 
importance of negotiations outside the official UNFCCC process. Actors blamed 
the perceived failure both on each other but also on the process, which increased 
the stakes for a real outcome in Mexico.    
The 16th Conference of Parties was held between 29 November and 11 
December 2011 in Cancun. The hype around this conference was lower than what 
it had been the previous year: the conference attracted less than one third, 12 000, 
of participants. Naturally, this conference also attracted less external attention, 
due to the lower level of expectations. However, a new objective had occurred 
since the Copenhagen negotiations: to save the UNFCCC process (PEW, 2010). 
The negotiations in Cancun exceeded most people’s expectations and the 
negotiating parties reached consensus. However, the Cancun Agreements passed 
the plenary, despite Bolivia’s refusal. One main difference from Copenhagen was 
that Bolivia did not receive any support from the other ALBA countries (these 
were passive and thus accepted the texts). Despite the consensus rule and 
Bolivia’s veto, the parties agreed on the texts that became the Cancun 
Agreements. The agreement includes crucial elements of especially transparency 
and finance, which will have a long-lasting effect on the climate regime. The next 
sub-chapter focuses on the first variable: the organizational culture.  
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5.1 Organizational Culture 
This variable is a key to understand the dynamics of the organizational process. In 
this thesis, the concept refers to the autonomy of the working process: the culture 
enables actors to rely on formal and informal rules, routines and norms, which 
implies that actors know how they and others will behave. The organizational 
culture is not something that changes from one year to another, although its role 
can shift dramatically. In many ways, the organizational culture is the backbone of 
an organization and its working process: it enables them to take efficient 
decisions. Opposite, when radical changes alter the working process, the 
organizational culture looses its function in the process. Lack of culture generates 
uncertainty and discontinuity. Without a clear and existing culture, actors cannot 
be foresighted or depend on informal rules, routines and norms, which causes an 
inefficient decision-making process.   
As already concluded, this section compares the organizational culture at the 
two subsequent climate change conferences. It is done through three different 
aspects of the organizational culture: (i) visions within the organization (ii) the 
role of routines and (iii) cultural fit of the host country. 
5.1.1 Vision  
A common vision is needed for a coherent and efficient organizational working 
process to be possible. Allison writes that ”each organization attends to a special 
set or problems and acts in a quasi-independence on these problems” and that 
actors ”behavior relevant to any important problem reflect the independent output 
of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders”. 
Furthermore, ”the beliefs create an organizational culture, market and accentuated 
by: (1) the way the organization has defined success in operational terms” 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 143, 167). Vision shall not be confused with 
interest. Parties naturally have different interest on key issues, but they can share a 
common understanding of the overarching objective. A multilateral climate 
conference consists of several concurrent and interdependent negotiations 
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them to be effective all parts of the organization must have a common 
understanding of what the principal goal should be.  
 As this section of the analysis shows, this was not the case in Copenhagen. The 
conference was shaped by a clear divide between those who expected the 
organization to work towards a legally binding agreement and those who wanted 
to prepare for a legally binding agreement at a later point. In Cancun, the whole 
organization shared a common vision: to save the UNFCCC process by reaching 
some real decisions.  
5.1.1.1 Conference of Parties 15 – Copenhagen Climate Conference   
The rebranding of the host city of Copenhagen to ”Hopenhagen”, for the duration 
of the conference, testifies of the high expectations that had been engendered. 
Even if the conference officially was one in a series of conferences, many 
described and perceived the 15th Conference of Parties as ”the last chance to save 
the planet” (Lord Stern in Gray, 2009). It had also been officially agreed two 
years earlier that the 15th Conference of Parties should agree on the topics 
outlined in the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2007, p. 5). Berridge (2010, p.58) 
describes the conference in Copenhagen as an artificial deadline due to the 
political momentum, which caused a general expectation of a legally binding 
agreement.  
Three years prior, the Danish environmental minister introduced the idea to host 
the prestigious 15th Conference of Parties in Denmark to the rest of the Danish 
organization (Meilgaard, 2010, p. 114). The Danish government worked hard to 
make the conference in Copenhagen to a successful one. Although, the 
negotiations moved slowly after the Bali conference and the high expectations 
started to wane during 2009 (Charbonneau, 2009). This got the Danish 
government to lower the expectations, by introducing the idea of one agreement- 
two steps, just one month before the conference started (Henry & Lothian, 2009 - 
Meilgaard, 2010, p. 125). It was an attempt to lower the expectations of a 
complete agreement in Copenhagen.   
The building up of expectations since 2007, and the sudden lowering of the 
same just before the conference started resulted in mixed visions of what to strive 
for. The downgrade of what the conference should produce was not something 
that all countries appreciated, or even accepted: India’s special envoy on climate 
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change Shyam Saran said, ”There is now a very deliberate attempt to downgrade 
international expectations and that is unfortunate” (WEF, 2009). Despite the 
notion of ”one agreement – two steps”, many countries expected the conference to 
produce a legally binding agreement (ENB, 2009, p.1). The main organizational 
vision was unclear when the conference started.  
Four options were possible when the conference started: (i) to strive for a legally 
binding agreement, (ii) to reach ”a comprehensive core decision” that could be 
further developed at a later point, (iii) a political declaration or (iv) no agreement 
“what so ever” (Dimitrov, 2010, p. 19). Most countries wanted to strive for the 
first two options, but the difference between them was significant: should the 
conference ”seal the deal” or postpone it to later. Most developed countries had 
stopped talking about a legally binding agreement in Copenhagen and instead 
focused on a “road map” to a robust agreement at a later point. “Others, however, 
especially vulnerable developing countries, continued working towards text that 
would result in a legally-binding outcome to be adopted in Copenhagen” (ENB, 
2009c, p. 4).  
The Danish vision was to reach a “politically binding agreement” in 
Copenhagen and then settle on the legal issues at a later point, in order to avoid a 
deadlock in Copenhagen (Meilstrup, 2010, p.125). In contrast, Tuvalu requested 
all parties to strive for a legally binding agreement and was backed by other small 
island states and by several countries from Latin America and Africa. Their 
request also got a backing from many observing NGOs (ENB, 2009f, p1). The 
vision of what the conference should produce was incoherent all through the 
conference.  
There was also a divide between the external expectations, which basically 
demanded the negotiators to ”save the planet” and the internal vision of what was 
possible. This external pressure did probably spur the internal divide further: 
between those who believed it was possible to “seal the deal” and reach a robust 
outcome and those who were being more pragmatic. An incoherent vision, or 
organizational goal, created uncertainty among the negotiators: how can the 
process work efficiently if the actors disagree upon the foundation of the 
agreement? The negotiators had diverse visions of what the conference should 
produce during the first week of the negotiations (ENB, 2009f, p.1). Since actors 
are representing their own organizations, including its interest and vision, a rapid 
  28 
change of the overall vision is hard to implement. The slow progress can partly be 
traced back to the lack of a coherent vision of what the organizational goal should 
be.   
5.1.1.2 Conference of Parties 16 – Cancun Climate Conference 
To avoid the same pressure ”to seal the deal”, the Mexican organization lowered 
expectations by stating that the high-level segment would not be overrunned by 
world leaders (ENB, 2010a, p. 12). Also the United Nation’s Secretary General 
Ban ki-Moon lowered the expectations by suggesting incremental steps, instead of 
proclaiming a grand deal, which he had done prior to the conference in 
Copenhagen (MacFarhquhar, 2010). The expectations of what the conference in 
Cancun should produce were modest and the main legally binding issues 
discussed and decided upon, were related to transparency and finance (ENB, 
2010, p.1). Since the expectations were lower, the vision of what the conference 
should produce became less contested.  
A main vision in Cancun became to revitalize the UNFCCC process. After the 
disappointing conference in Copenhagen, many leaders doubted on the efficiency 
of future climate talks under the UN umbrella and proposed alternative forums. 
Yvo de Boer, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC during 2009, wrote after 
the conference in Copenhagen, ’Does this spell the end of the UNFCCC process?’ 
(De Boer in Meilgaard, 2010a). Since the negotiators, and process managers, are 
the central parts of the UNFCCC process they cherish it. Before the conference in 
Cancun, the parties had a shared desire to ”save the UNFCCC process” (Vihma & 
Kulovesi, 2010, p.10). No one did any longer pursue an agreement that would 
”seal the deal”: rather all parties agreed that a more focused agreement containing 
a few key areas should be the organizational goal. When the conference started, 
the majority of the actors had a common vision of what the conference could 
produce.  
Copenhagen had been lifted to the sky by the Danish organization, Ban ki-Moon 
and the whole climate organization. While most actors agreed that it was time “to 
seal the deal” they did not agree whether a legally binding agreement should be 
agreed in Copenhagen or at a later stage. The vision in Cancun was more modest 
and pragmatic. Instead of agreeing on everything, they decided to agree on some 
key issues. A common vision, that was agreeable by all parties in the organization, 
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to keep the most important climate negotiation within their hands: in other words 
to save the UNFCCC process.  
5.1.2 Routine 
Routine is an integral part of the organizational process.  As concluded before, the 
history of the UNFCCC process shows that the process moves slowly and makes 
incremental improvements, in line with the assumptions made in Allison’s (1999, 
ch. 2) Organizational Process Model. This section of the analysis shows that 
actor’s routines were altered in Copenhagen due to high expectations and external 
pressure. The process got stuck partly because the actors did not have standard 
operating procedures to follow. Furthermore, the special circumstances that 
surrounded the conference in Copenhagen generated uncertainty among the 
actors. As concluded by an individual from the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
“Expectation of both was different. Copenhagen should seal the deal, but Cancun 
was more a normal working COP”.2  
5.1.2.1 Conference of Parties 15 – Copenhagen Climate Conference 
As written, the conference in Copenhagen became subject to an unprecedented 
level of public and media attention (ENB, 2009, p. 1). The external pressure of 
what the conference could achieve interfered with negotiators’ routines. First of 
all, the unprecedented number of 115 heads of states attending an environmental 
negotiation changed the working mode in the process. This is how the Earth 
Negotiation Bulletin puts it, “the arrival of 115 Heads of States and Government 
in Copenhagen changed the dynamics and routines of the negotiations” (ENB, 
2009, p. 28). The perceived importance and the participation of almost all the 
leaders of the world naturally altered the internal culture of the organization, as 
well as its routines.  
 
“Now we really are at the center of the world’s attention – I do hope we will be 
able to live up to the great hopes and expectations” 
    Comment by one negotiator (ENB, 2009b, p. 4) 
 
                                                
2 Interview – UNFCCC Secretariat1  
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Secondly, the international pressure with massive demonstrations that occurred 
in Copenhagen did also create a certain tension among the negotiators. From the 
Earth Negotiation Bulletin: ”Inside the conference center, groups of delegates 
gathered to watch live images of the demonstrators. Many were heard 
commenting on the incredibly large numbers of people urging Copenhagen to 
provide a meaningful outcome” (ENB, 2009g, p. 3). An external scrutiny of every 
action logically affected the negotiation mode inside the venue.  
Practical arrangement in Copenhagen did not either follow normal routines. 
Many described the waiting outside the venue as “chaos”, 40 000 participants had 
been granted access in advance, but the venue could only hold 15 000 people, 
which resulted in that participants, and among them negotiators, had to wait in up 
to eight-ten hours during the first days in order to receive their credentials 
(Stavins, 2009 – ENB, 2009, p. 28). Despite the fact that overcrowded venues 
might have resulted in a bad mood among the negotiators, it also proved that the 
working process would not proceed as usual. 
Negotiations under the UNFCCC process move slowly and incrementally, due to 
the big number of parties and decision-making rules based on consensus. Actors, 
internally and externally, demanded the conference to move forward rapidly, 
which created an unfamiliar situation for the negotiators. With higher pressure in 
Copenhagen, with external attention and a big number of heads of states, the 
normal routines could not be kept intact. The 15th Conference of Parties was not a 
normal negotiation and the normal routines could not be used, which led to many 
time-consuming instances.  
5.1.2.2. Conference of Parties 16 – Cancun Climate Conference 
Due to a lower level of expectation at the Cancun Climate Conference, the 
external pressure also became lower. However, the internal pressure within the 
organization was high, both process managers and negotiators wanted to show the 
public that the UNFCCC process was a good forum for global climate 
agreements. More importantly, the 16th Conference of Parties in Cancun was a 
”normal working COP”3. There were no major interference with routines and the 
negotiators were able to work efficiently.  
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Learning from the chaos in Copenhagen, the Mexican promised that the high-
level segment should not be overrunned by world leaders (ENB, 2010a, p. 12). 
This resulted in that only a handful of heads of states attended the high-level 
segment in Cancun. Just as in Copenhagen, the Cancun Conference was also hit 
by demonstrations, due to the exclusion of civil society groups (Democracynow, 
2010). However, these protests were local and did not have the same global 
magnitude as the ones in Copenhagen did.  
The external pressure in Copenhagen affected the organizational culture. Every 
step the negotiators took was covered by some organization or media channel. 
The attention affected their routines and standard operating procedures, which 
caused an inefficient process. In Cancun, the external pressure was low and the 
organizational culture was back to normal. The negotiators in Cancun could rely 
on existing routines, which released time for them to find common grounds.  
5.1.3 Presidencies cultural fit  
The president is an external element in the organization, which officially enters 
the organization at the first day of the Conference of Parties. Since the president 
becomes the most powerful process manager of the conference, its adaptability 
and fit to the current organizational culture will affect the working process. 
Depledge writes that the main role for the presidency is, together with the 
secretariat, to facilitate an effective negotiation process. She also writes that the 
two most crucial characteristics of an effective president are continuity and 
experience (Depledge, 2006, pp. 35-36, 53). Except its cultural fit, an effective 
president must be willing and have the skills to adapt to the existing 
organizational process. 
This section of the analysis shows that the Danish presidency was a bad match. 
First of all, the Danish organization’s tactic to ”lead” the process rather than just 
facilitate it, did not fit well into the existing culture, which is defined by 
impartiality and the central notion that the process is ”party-driven”. The Danes 
took several decisions, and especially the shift of president in the middle of the 
conference, that interfered the continuity of the negotiation process.     
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5.1.3.1 Conference of Parties 15 – Copenhagen Climate Conference 
 
The cultural fit of the Danish organization was low. The leading division within 
the Danish organization, the Prime Minister’s office, lacked experience of the 
UNFCCC process and questioned its efficiency (Meilgaard, 2010). The clearest 
sign of this was their willingness to “lead” rather than just facilitate the process 
(Meilgaard, 2010, pp. 117-120). A tactic that is very controversial in a UN led 
process, where the president represents all negotiating parties’ interests. ”‘Our 
decision to equate chairmanship with leadership was more groundbreaking than 
we knew’, as one senior Danish diplomat put it” (Ibid, 2010, p. 119).  
While the UNFCCC process generally moves slowly, primarily through 
discussions between experts, the Danish organization wanted to fast-forward this 
process by negotiating directly with world leaders. External and informal 
negotiations were supposed to create the path to an agreement in Copenhagen 
(Lidegaard, 2010, p. 26) The Prime Minister’s office was in 2009 engaged in 
external negotiations in both G8 (Park, 2011) and the Major Economic Forum on 
Energy and Climate (Lidegaard, 2012, pp. 28-29). The president’s choice to lead 
and engage in informal negotiations outside the UNFCCC process was not in line 
with the existing organizational culture. Even if it is common that presidents 
engage in external negotiations, their main focus must still be on the process that 
they are formally chairing.  
Another event affecting the continuity of the process was the shift of president in 
the middle of the conference. ”COP President’s Special Representative Hedegaard 
noted that as a consequence of the arrival of the large number of Heads of State 
and Government, it was appropriate that the Prime Minister of Denmark take over 
the position of the COP President.” (ENB, 2009b, p.1). It was an organizational 
decision made by the Prime Minister’s office, in order to restore the power 
balance between the president and the negotiators. As one negotiator said, “It 
would be hard to have a climate minister negotiating with Prime Ministers”4 but 
the shift “wasn’t dealt with so elegantly”5. The shift generated ”lot of speculation 
in the corridors and the media” and many negotiators saw it as a ”dramatic 
resignation”, while others had been informed in advance (ENB, 2009b, p. 4).  
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The Danish organization and the existing organizational culture was a bad 
cultural fit. This was mostly due to the Danes unwillingness to adapt and comply 
with the existing rules. However, if the Danish organization would have complied 
with existing rules and norms, the process would have moved slowly and the 
possible agreement would not have matched their organizational goal (which they 
had invested a lot of time in building up, see Park, 2011). In other words, the 
Danish organization tried to speed up the process, but instead generated 
uncertainty and discontinuity in the working process.   
5.1.3.2 Conference of Parties 16 – Cancun Climate Conference 
The Mexican’s cultural fit was much higher. They went back to the original idea 
of the presidency: to primarily facilitate the negotiation process. Another way to 
put it, is that the Mexicans were not as visible as the Danes. While the Danish 
organization was pushing for a strong agreement, the Mexican organization 
worked behind the scenes (Monheim, 2011, p. 210). Another difference was that 
the Danes focused on the outcome of the process, trying to push through a text, 
while the Mexicans primarily focused on creating an efficient working process.   
However, they did not only follow existing culture. An innovative tactic, that 
might have affected the organizational culture, was the bold idea of the Mexican 
presidency to pair Ministers from developed and developing countries to lead 
different parts of the negotiations. Another tactic was to hold recurrent 
stocktaking-meetings, in which the participants received updates on progress in 
different sub-negotiation groups (ENB, 2010). These were negotiation tactics that 
had been used frequently in the World Trade Organization but never before in a 
UNFCCC negotiation (Khor, 2011). Since these tactics were created to enhance 
the level of transparency and build bridges between countries, they were more 
compatible with the existing organizational culture, which to a great extent builds 
on inclusiveness and transparency.  
In general, the Mexican organization proved to be more compatible with the 
existing organizational culture. Much of this was due to their lower profile and 
better understanding of the process. Another essential difference was that the 
tactics used by the Mexicans were primarily focused on facilitating a better 
negotiation process, in other words, to enhance what was already there. While, the 
main tactic of the Danish organization was to generate progress externally.   
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5.1.4 Conclusions 
The 15th Conference of Parties was a special conference in many ways. It gathered 
an unprecedented number of participants and public interest. This together with 
the “leading” approach by the Danish organization altered the organizational 
culture. Actors could no longer be certain of what informal rules, routines and 
norms that were valid. Uncertainness among negotiators on how to move forward 
led to many time-consuming instances, such as the round of statements during the 
final days of the conference (ENB, 2009, p. 27). One of the reasons for confusion 
was the incoherent and overlapping negotiation at the expert-level and ministerial-
level (see Raman, 2009, pp.- 41-42). The 16th Conference of Parties, on the other 
hand, was a ”normal” climate negotiation with a bigger focus on transparency, 
inclusiveness and with a minimal level of interference by the host country.  
This chapter has shown that the organizational culture in Copenhagen was 
altered through a comparative analysis of three organizational aspects: visions, 
routines and the cultural fit of the presidency. First of all, the whole organization 
did not strive for the same organizational output when the conference started: 
some parties wanted a legally binding agreement while other wanted the 
conference to be a step towards a legally binding agreement at a later point. 
Secondly, uncertainness and incontinuity pervaded the conference in Copenhagen 
and many actors did not know how to behave. Finally, the leadership by the 
Mexican organization was more compatible with the existing organizational 
culture within the UNFCCC process.  
The inefficient process, partly due to the altered organizational culture, was one 
of the reasons to why the negotiations moved slowly in Copenhagen. Inefficiency 
at the expert-level of the negotiations, due to confusion and an incoherent process, 
implied that the amount of work they handed over to the high-level negotiators 
was insuperable, which in extension forced a ”friends of the chair” meeting and 
finally a closed negotiation between the United States and the BASIC countries, 
which many countries deemed undemocratic and un-transparent.  
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5.2 Alignment of process managers  
The process managers consist of the Presiding officers together with the 
UNFCCC Secretariat. Presiding officers, or often referred to as chairmen, are 
divided into three institutional layers; (i) the chair of the conference is the 
president, (ii) the chairs of the different negotiating bodies and working groups 
and (iii) the chairs of the smaller informal negotiating groups. The most powerful 
of these is the top layer: the president, who is formally elected by the parties, but 
in reality selected by the host government (Depledge, 2007, p. 47). In order to not 
complicate things too much, this thesis will not focus on the second and third 
layer of presiding officers. While a new president enters every year, the secretariat 
constitutes the backbone of the UNFCCC process.  
  Both the chairmen and the secretariat are mandated to impartiality (Yammin and 
Depledge, 2005, p. 485). The president must represent all parties’ interest and be 
impartial between their differences. Much due to the divide between developed 
and developing countries, the nationality of the president matters. The general 
view among the participants is that no matter how much ”an individual lays claim 
to impartiality, embedded perceptions and positions will always show through” 
(Depledge, 2007, p. 47). Parties have even higher impartiality standards for the 
secretariat and many powerful parties have strong interests in not allowing the 
secretariat to exceed its power outside its official mandate (Busch, 2009, p. 254).  
Busch (2009, p. 259) concludes that the biggest influence of the climate 
secretariats lays with its organizational expertise, ”the climate secretariat’s 
outstanding expertise enables it to provide parties with useful advice on any legal, 
procedural or technical issue in the negotiation”. As one secretariat said ”the 
secretariat provides a landscape rather than how to get through it”6. For the whole 
organizational process to work efficiently, the process managers must be 
cooperative and well aligned in order to be able to facilitate a good negotiation 
process. A high demand for impartiality also shapes much of the secretariats 
internal organization. Busch writes “staff working at the climate secretariat has 
internalized the expectations of the parties and has accepted their definition of 
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boundaries, thereby limiting itself to a technocratic and politically neutral 
approach in any of its activities” and that the “secretariat strives to ensure that 
parties perceive it as impartial body that does not favor one party’s views” (ibid, 
257). This was also evident in my own interview with two secretariats where they 
emphasized that the secretariat only provides “support when needed”7  
   This part of the analysis is primarily focusing on two indicators that reveal 
different stories of the alignment between the process managers. As already 
depicted, these sub-variables have mainly been extracted from a careful reading of 
the Bureaucratic model described by Allison and Zelikow (1999, ch.5). The first 
indicator that is assessed is the key player’s understanding of the process. A better 
understanding induces a better process since it facilitates both continuity and 
smoothness for the participants. A second indicator considered, is the diplomatic 
actions made by the process managers. When negotiations get stuck, the process 
managers and especially the president can use different techniques, or strategies, 
to push for progress. These actions are in this model views as organizational 
outputs. The quality of these actions depends on the alignment between the 
process managers. Before zooming in on the indicators, a short analysis of what 
the general alignment looked like in Copenhagen and Cancun is provided.  
In order to understand the Danish organization’s alignment with the UNFCCC 
secretariat, it is necessary to first look at the alignment within the Danish 
organization. The Danish organization was divided into two sub-divisions: the 
Ministry of Environment and the Prime Minister’s Office. Meilstrup (2010, p. 
117) quotes a senior public official who said, ”the Prime Minister’s Office and the 
Ministry of the Environment from the beginning formed two, separate mental 
tracks”. They had different cultures, organizational procedures and goals. 
Logically, they also had different views on what needed to be done, which is a 
key to understanding the events in Copenhagen.     
In contrast, the Mexican organization was coherent. President Calderon gave the 
full responsibility to the Ministry of Foreign Policy and the leadership to Patricia 
Espinosa (Monheim, 2013). Calderon’s choice of doing this must of course also 
be understood as an organizational output. It is reasonable to assume that the 
Mexican organization took notice of what happened in Copenhagen (with the 
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divide within the Danish organization). Furthermore, the organizational 
competitiveness, within the Mexican organization, was probably lower because of 
the lower international prestige that the conference in Cancun embodied. It is 
possible that president Calderon or the Ministry of Environment would demand 
more to say if the Cancun conference was supposed to ”seal the deal” and was 
attended by over 100 world leaders. However, this move, to fully empower 
Espinosa, made any divisional clashes within the Mexican organization 
improbable.  
   The other division within the process managers was within the United Nations 
and the UNFCCC. In 2009, they suffered from internal contradictions represented 
by the climate specialists in the UNFCCC Secretariat and the general organization 
of United Nations Secretariat. The Conference of Parties is not a “subsidiary of 
the General Assembly” but an autonomous body (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 
404). Due to the magnitude of the 15th Conference of Parties, the United Nations 
Secretariat and its Secretary General Ban ki-Moon were involved: mainly by 
creating a momentum around the conference with the arrangement of the Climate 
Week. This was a climate summit in New York on September 2009, which 
included formal discussions between 100 of heads of states (see e.g. Gertz, 2009). 
This was bargaining that occurred outside the formal UNFCCC process. Monheim 
(2011, p. 207) writes, ”UN system showed serious deficits with an internal split 
between New York and Bonn”. After the conference in Copenhagen, much of the 
external interest and expectation faded and so did the interest of the general 
United Nation and its Secretary General Ban ki-Moon.  
After Copenhagen, the new Executive Secretary of UNFCCC, Christiana 
Figueres, and the United Nation’s Secretary General, Ban ki-Moon, urged the 
importance of getting ”the process back on track” (ENB, 2010, p. 27). No one at 
the United Nations did no longer urge that it was time to ”seal the deal”, rather 
that ”there should be progress on all fronts” (ENB, 2010, p. 27). This was also 
more aligned with Mexican’s expectations of what the conference should produce. 
The Mexican President, Calderon, underscored the importance of rebuilding trust 
and confidence in the multilateral system (UNFCCC, 2010). In short, the overall 
alignment was better in 2010 than in 2009, both within the United Nations 
organization and within the host government.  
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5.2.1 Organizational Expertise  
 
Process managers have a better chance to facilitate a smooth and efficient process if 
they use all of its potential resources. In other words, a good alignment between the 
process managers fosters better expertise and in extension enables better decisions. In 
contrast to the secretariats, which work with process constantly and, therefore, possess a 
great knowledge of its elements, host government’s understanding varies (Depledge, 
2007, p. 47). As one secretariat said, the use of the secretariats support ”completely 
depends on the presidencies or the chairs and how they will use that support”8. 
Furthermore, the UNFCCC Secretariat can provide an ”institutional memory”9 and an 
”institutional knowledge about the process, the historic process and parties positions”.10 
While the secretariats possess a greater knowledge of the process and parties’ 
sensitivities, the host country can use its diplomatic channels to foster trust and 
consensus.  
5.2.1.1 Conference of Parties 15 – Copenhagen Climate Negotiation   
The understanding of the process within the Danish organization was inadequate. 
As written, the Danish organization was divided into two core divisions: led by 
The Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen and the chief of the Ministry of 
Environment: Connie Hedegaard. Yvo de Boer, the UNFCCC Executive 
Secretary in Copenhagen, wrote in a letter after the conference “there were two 
schools of thought within the Danish Presidency” (Vidal, 2010).  Also Monheim 
(2013, pp. 185-186) concludes that there was a clash within the Danish leadership 
and quotes an official within the Hedegaard’s team who said that ”the whole 
administration was against the Prime Minister’s office”. This divide naturally had 
implications on how the organizational expertise came to use.  
Lidegaard was Rasmussen’s right hand, and together they formed the leadership 
of Prime Ministers’ group, their expertise was especially in the area of finance and 
foreign policy. Lidegaard possessed a limited insight in the process, as on 
negotiator said, ”he was ’not an expert of UN meetings’” (in Monheim, 2013, p. 
198). Rasmussen had a background as a Minster of Interior and Health and as 
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Minster of Finance, he had been inaugurated as Prime Minister in April in 2009, 
just six months before he became president of the conference. Rasmussen’s chief 
climate coordinator Bo Lidegaard describes this brief preparation time as an 
“ungrateful” challenge due to the complexity of the negotiations and its process 
(Lidegaard, 2012. p. 26). Both Lidegaard and Rasmussen were pretty new to the 
UNFCCC process, Lidegaard joined in 2007 and Rasmussen in 2009, which 
implied two things; (i) they did not have the time to properly understand the 
dynamics of the UNFCCC processes and (ii) they had not time enough to build 
real relationships and trust with the negotiators and the secretariats.  
The leaders of the other Danish division were Connie Hedegaard and Denmark’s 
chief climate negotiator, Thomas Becker (Meilgaard, 2010). These two possessed 
a solid understanding of international climate negotiations and the UNFCCC 
process. Hedegaard had a background as Minster of Environment and  Minister of 
Climate and Energy while Becker had been the chief climate negotiator for 
Denmark and the European Union for several years. Together, they had a good 
understanding of the organizational process and valuable relationships with other 
negotiators. 
A main disagreement was over which divisions that should be in charge of the 
conference. This position should logically be given to the Ministry of 
Environment, which deals with climate issues and possess a good understanding 
of climate negotiations and the UNFCCC process (Meilgaard, 2010, pp. 116-117). 
However, due to the magnitude of the conference and the political prestige of 
chairing an important global meeting, the Prime Minister’s office did not want to 
hand over the power. The Prime Minister’s office secured this in 2007 when they 
established the Danish climate secretariat that should ”coordinate the work with 
the climate conference”. Ministers from several different ministries were included 
and the head of this secretariat became Bo Lidegaard, who was reporting directly 
to the Prime Minister’s office (Statsministeriet, 2007).  
One key problem for the Danish organization in terms of expertise was the loss 
of Thomas Becker. He was fired from his job as Denmark’s chief climate 
negotiator just two months before the conference. Becker had for a long time been 
Denmark’s chief negotiator in the UNFCCC process and was “the most 
experienced and most well respected” within the Danish organization (Meilgaard, 
2010, p. 9). Becker left the organization after a stormy relationship with the 
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Danish climate secretariat, and especially its leader Lidegaard, which even 
resulted in that Becker was “excluded from meetings” (Rothenborg et al. 2009). 
The official reason was that Becker had misused the official travel account, a 
reason that later was questioned (Thiemann, 2010). Hedegaard said in a later 
interview that the Danish organization really had needed Becker’s experience and 
relationships at the conference (Meilgaard, 2010, p. 10). As a negotiator said in an 
interview, “that was also something, which played out pretty badly”11 referring to 
Becker’s exit prior to the conference.  
 
“Becker was renowned as one of the few diplomats from any of the developed countries 
who had warm relations with colleagues from the developing countries, precisely the 
competencies most needed in intense negotiations with the threat looming of conflicts 
between rich and poor countries. ‘All of this is what Becker masters. We missed it...’ as 
Connie Hedegaard put it afterwards.” 
Connie Hedegaard (in Meilgaard, 2009, p. 10)  
 
The alignment was bad between the Prime Minister’s office and the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. As Allison points out: “Organizational priorities shape organizational 
implementation” (1999, p. 177). The Danish organization, and especially the 
Prime Minister’s office, had different priorities than the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
The Prime Minister’s office “lacked a lot of contacts with the guys and women 
who were really involved in the UNFCCC negotiations [...] those who really knew 
the texts and different trajections”12. Furthermore, “Rasmussen had no good 
insight”13 in how the UNFCCC process works. In short, the Danish organization 
would have had a better chance, to push for consensus and to implement a 
negotiation text, if they had used the expertise within the UNFCCC Secretariat 
and kept their chief negotiator on board for the duration of the conference.  
5.2.1.2 Conference of Parties 16 – Cancun Climate Conference 
Mexico’s President Calderon fully supported his choice of president. Patricia 
Espinosa Cantellano. Learning from the Copenhagen experience, the Mexican 
President sought to secure that no internal conflicts interfered with their 
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management of the conference. He, therefore, gave the whole responsibility for 
the conference to the Ministry of Foreign Policy, where Espinosa was in charge 
(Park, 2011, p. 47). The choice of the Ministry of Foreign Policy before the 
Ministry of Environment (which had been the standard in the UNFCCC process), 
can be seen as a choice of diplomacy before expertise. However, the lack of 
expertise of the UNFCCC process, within the Ministry of Foreign Policy, was 
mitigated through a functioning alignment with the UNFCCC Secretariat. The 
procedural management, combining Mexican’s diplomatic skills with the climate 
secretariat’s procedural experience, was efficient in Cancun.   
 The Mexican organization had been in charge of a big multilateral conference, 
also in Cancun, just seven years prior to the climate conference: the World Trade 
Organization’s Ministerial Conference in 2003. This conference had “collapsed 
because of internal squabbles and irreconcilable philosophical differences 
between the developed countries and the developing countries” (Yallapragada, 
2007, p. 55). President Calderon had been the Secretary of Energy during the time 
of the WTO conference and several actors within the Mexican organization had 
been involved in the previous conference. As Allison & Zelikow (1999, p. 171) 
write, organizations do sometimes learn and change and after a havoc like the one 
in Cancun 2003. It is likely that the organization gathered experience that became 
useful seven years later. The Mexican also implemented several tactics, which 
have been common within the WTO negotiation process, but never before 
practiced within the UNFCCC process (Khor, 2010). Furthermore, it is likely that 
the Mexican organization grasped, after the WTO conference, the importance of 
building trust and confidence between developed and developing countries, which 
is a key to a successful outcome in both regimes.  
The new Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC did, despite her short time at the 
position, possess a great expertise of the organizational process and parties 
sensitivities: she had been participating in the process as a Costa Rican delegate 
since 1995. The Executive Secretary, Christiana Figueres, and the COP President, 
Patricia Espinosa, showed up a unified front at the conference (Feldman, 2010 – 
Park, 2011, p. 47). The relationship between the Mexicans and the UNFCCC 
Secretariat had developed during 2010 and gotten much better when Figueres was 
inaugurated as the chief of the UNFCCC Secretariat. A sign of their collaboration 
was that the Mexican organization directed a liaison to work directly with the 
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UNFCCC Secretariat, a tactic that enhanced the exchange of views and 
contributed to a more coherent management strategy (Monheim, 2011, p. 217-
218). Furthermore, when the Mexican organization compiled the final negotiation 
text, they took advice from experts within the secretariat, mainly on how to 
balance parties’ sensitivities and agendas (Ibid, 2011, pp. 218).   
5.2.2 Organizational Diplomacy  
What determines each player’s impact on the result? The Organizational Process 
Model’s answer is that it is ”an elusive blend of three elements: bargaining 
advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other player’s 
perception of the firs two” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 300). As already 
concluded, the most powerful actor in managing the negotiation process is the 
president followed by the UNFCCC Executive Secretary. For the process 
managers to be successful, they must possess enough bargaining power and both 
the skill and will to use this power. Needless to say, actions taken by the process 
managers are organizational outputs: shaped by the organizational process and 
possible conflicts between different divisions. 
5.2.2.1 Conference of Parties 15 - Copenhagen Climate Conference  
An essential part of the Danish organization’s diplomatic preparations can be 
summarized in, the series of informal ministerial meetings called, the Greenland 
dialogue, which initially was Hedegaard’s initiative (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 120). Six 
meetings were held between before the conference in Copenhagen. The Danish 
organization invited ministers from key countries, in order to build trust and 
consensus between parties. In the first dialogue, 25 parties14 were invited 
(Folketinget, 2005): while 12 European parties were participating, there was only 
one party (Tuvalu) from the least developed countries and no party from the 
ALBA group. The invited ministers appreciated the meetings and the Danish 
leaders succeeded to create a stronger relationship with the Chinese ministers  
(Meilstrup, 2010, p. 120).   
                                                
14 Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, European Commission, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greenland, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Russia, South Africa, 
Sweden, Tuvalu, United Kingdom and United States of America.  
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 The Danish organization and especially the Prime Minister’s office wanted the 
United States and China on board in the Copenhagen agreement (Meilgaard, 2010 
– Park, 2011, p. 39). The Danish organization wanted to avoid another agreement 
with the absence of the United States, who had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
One negotiator said, “it was very important to get the the United States on board 
and in my opinion they went too far in that direction”15, referring to the Danish 
organization. The president of the United State had also initiated a forum for 
informal negotiations between powerful countries: the Major Economic Forum 
(MEF) on Energy and Climate. Denmark’s strategy was to push for progress, both 
within the UNFCCC negotiations and in external negotiations, such as in MEF, 
G8 and in other UN summits (Lidegaard, 2012, p. 30). However, the Danish 
Prime Minister’s office bypassed the UNFCCC process, when engaging directly 
with world leaders. This happened despite a strong opposition from the Ministry 
of Environment and Hedegaard, who had a better understanding of the climate 
process and more relationships with developing parties (Park, 2011, p. 39). She, 
therefore, also possessed a better understanding of the sensitivities of developing 
parties and the risks of neglecting the official process.    
 The alignment within the UN did also suffer during 2009. While the UNFCCC 
Secretariat focused on the expert-level of negotiators, the United Nations and their 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon focused on the leaders. Ban ki-Moon invited the 
world’s leaders, to a climate summit in New York in September 2009 (Gertz, 
2009). This event got some consequences for the negotiation in Copenhagen; (i) it 
raised the expectation further by having the summit, in the previously climate 
skeptical, United States and by including a speak by president Obama, (ii) Ban ki-
Moon invited business representatives, which until then been left outside of the 
climate negotiations (Flannery, 2009), and by many seen as a key part of the 
problem and (iii) the summit further increased the organizational divide within the 
United Nations and within the Danish government: it divided the process into 
experts and leaders.  
  This organizational divide implied that two separate negotiations took place: 
one between the experts and one among the world’s leaders. The occurrence of 
negotiations on different levels is not necessarily bad for the process. However, it 
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requires an organization process that ties the two levels together. This was 
unfortunately not the case during 2009. Symptomatic for this divide was that 
Hedegaard was president of the conference during the expert level, while 
Rasmussen took over when the high-level segment started.       
5.2.2.2 Conference of Parties 16 – Cancun Climate Conference   
The Mexican organization deemed diplomacy more important than expertise: they 
focused their skills and energy on finding common ground between the parties. 
Dean Bialek (2010), who advised the delegation of the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands at Cancun, writes: “One moment will stick with me from that small room: 
Mexico’s expert deal-broker and career multilateralist ambassador Luis Alfonso 
de Alba defused a particularly tense moment with the line ’whether we agree or 
not, every concern is legitimate’”. Dan Bosco (2010) writes that the Mexican 
”diplomatic team displayed great skill, giving all parties a voice”. The leading 
division within the Mexican organization was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which had good ties internationally.    
However, their diplomatic agenda would not have been effective without a good 
alignment with the UNFCCC. Christiana Figueres took over as the secretariat’s 
leader, with an enthusiasm and a yes-we-can attitude. She was also better than 
Yvo de Boer at handling the media, which shot down many rumors (Araya, 2011). 
Together with the COP president Espinosa she created a unified and non-
threatening leadership. The fact that the two most powerful process managers, 
where women from developing countries, compared to men from developed 
countries in Copenhagen, might have been an advantage when they were trying to 
bridge gaps between developed and developing countries. However, their 
diplomatic skills were probably more important. Figueres had been a climate 
delegate for 15 years and Espinosa was a careerist with deep multilateral expertise 
(Monheim, 2011, p. 130).  
The Mexican organization was also the initiator of the Cartagena Dialogue for 
Progressive Action, which is “an informal space open to countries working 
towards an ambitious, comprehensive and legally-binding regime under the 
UNFCCC” (ENB, 2010b, p.2). This informal gathering of countries included 
parties from Latin America, Africa, Asia, Small Island States, Europe, Australia 
and New Zealand and more importantly both developed and developing countries. 
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They gathered three times before the Cancun conference and continued to do so 
after worth. It has been described as a constructive forum where polarization of 
the annexes can be solved (Araya, 2011). It is worth nothing that the Cartagena 
dialogue had better initial chances than the Greenland dialogue, to generate some 
real trust, due to lower stakes and tension in the process during 2010.  
The Mexican diplomatic orientation, prior to the conference, was much focused 
on persuading the countries that maybe would oppose an upcoming agreement, 
especially the ALBA countries. The Mexican organization had a better starting 
point here, being a Latin American country with good connections with many of 
the ALBA countries. For example, Espinosa, the COP president, had previously in 
her career worked to reestablish Mexico’s relationship with Venezuela and Cuba, 
two ALBA members (see BBC, 2007). Additionally, the new UNFCCC Executive 
Secretary did also come from a country within in the region and she did also 
possess good connections with these countries and their leaders.     
In the final day of the conference, Bolivia opposed the Cancun agreements. 
Espinosa solved what became the biggest hurdle of the conference through smart 
diplomacy and by listening to the advice from the UNFCCC Secretariat. She said,  
 
“Consensus requires that everyone is given the right to be heard and have their views 
given due consideration, and Bolivia has been given this opportunity. Consensus does not 
mean that one country has the right of veto, and can prevent 193 others from moving 
forward after years of negotiations on something that our societies and future 
generations expect.”      (ENB, 2010, p. 28).  
 
This was a new definition of “consensus”, which had not existed in the 
UNFCCC before, although a similar definition has been common within the WTO 
negotiating process (Khor, 2011). The Mexican organization’s diplomatic strategy 
was superior to the Danes. They had valuable expertise from hosting a similar 
multilateral conference, but also better connections with key countries. 
Furthermore, the well-suited diplomatic strategies were developed through a good 
alignment with the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
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5.2.3 Conclusions 
As one of the negotiators said, “the relationship between the Danish government 
and the secretariat was pretty bad”16, and it was “not very cooperative”17. My 
findings show that this was mostly due to two variables. Firstly, the Prime 
Minister’s office in the Danish organization did not trust the efficiency of the 
UNFCCC process and starting to push for progress through the world leaders 
directly, which created two incoherent levels of negotiations. The Prime 
Minister’s office did this, despite warnings from within the Danish organization 
and from the UNFCCC Secretariat (Meilgaard, 2010). Secondly, the alignment 
was bad due to the high expectations: divisional interests were too high for a 
successful alignment to be possible.   
 One result was that a lot of resources within the organization was unused due to 
the weak alignment. This excluded possible alternatives: the organization 
constrained possibilities. A better alignment, with the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
would probably result in better actions of the Danish organization. However, this 
was not possible because the objectives, of the UNFCCC Secretariat, were not in 
line with the ones of the Danish organization. This limited the Danish 
organization’s bargaining advantage to a minimum: since many negotiators 
viewed any action taken by the Danes suspiciously. The COP presidential shift, 
which probably was an organizational necessity, did not benefit the feeling of 
continuity in the working process.  
The Mexican organization was more successful in using the expertise available 
within the UNFCCC Secretariat. Mexico’s strategy was more focused on 
diplomacy, they invested a lot of time and energy in building trust among the 
negotiating parties: especially between developed and developing countries. Not 
just their diplomatic skills, but also their position as a rich developing country 
might have benefited them. Since the nationality of the president matter (see 
Depledge, 2007, p. 47), Mexico had a better starting point, being a relatively 
prosperous developing country, with good ties in both “camps”. As illustrated in 
one interview, the Mexicans had good “connections in the ALBA countries and in 
                                                
16 Interview – Negotiator1 
17 Interview – Negotiator1 
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the US”18. Their strong diplomatic relationships within the Latin American 
countries did help them to push some of the ALBA countries from objecting in 
Copenhagen to consenting in Cancun. Furthermore, the new Executive Secretary 
of the UNFCCC, did also come from a developing country in the region: through 
a good alignment with the Mexican’s, she provided the negotiators with confident 
and trust in the process and its managers, which generated a smooth negotiating 
process.       
5.3 Transparency  
Transparency can generate a higher level of trust between negotiating parties, 
which is needed in order to get all parties to agree to one agreement. However, the 
process managers must ensure a good balance between procedural effectiveness 
and transparency (Depledge, 2005). Too much transparency might spawn 
redundant discussions on minor items, which might take time from essential 
issues and thus create an inefficient negotiation process. A transparent process 
allows actors to fully prepare and discuss options within their own organization 
and negotiation group. This last chapter of the analysis is analyzing how 
transparency affected the climate negotiations in Copenhagen and Cancun. Two 
indicators are being analyzed in this section: (i) the occurrences of small group 
negotiations and the level of transparency within these, and (ii) the procedural 
preparation of negotiation texts. 
Transparency became a recurrent topic of debate in Copenhagen: the reason 
for this was a perceived lack of transparency in the process (ENB, 2009, p. 1). 
Many parties believed that the conference should reach a robust and a long-term 
agreement that potentially could impact their country and their organization’s 
popularity. It is reasonable to assume that all parties wanted to be informed about 
every turn of events. The lack of transparency was one of the reasons for why 
there was a lack of trust between parties at the conference. The shortage of 
transparency did also increase the level of uncertainty. For example, did secret 
                                                
18 Interview – Negotiator1 
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negotiations occur? And would the process managers try to push trough a new 
negotiation text?    
In 2010, the organizational process adapted and took notice of what had 
happened at the conference in Copenhagen. One of the lessons was the importance 
of transparency. The Mexican presidency understood that the level of trust must 
be increased and concluded that the only possible way to this was to ensure a 
transparent and inclusive process. In order to avoid any rumors that a “Mexican 
text” might “drop from the sky” the new COP president Espinosa reassured the 
negotiators daily, by saying that there were no “Mexican text” (ENB, 2010). She 
also emphasized that all parties were welcomed to all meetings. At an informal 
stocktaking meeting, Espinosa said,  
 
“Throughout 2010, and in our meetings here in Cancun, we have sought to build 
understandings while also enhancing confidence. Every party must know what is 
happening and see that its views have been considered. In negotiations between sovereign 
States, no group small or large can take decisions in the name of everybody else.” 
Patricia Espinosa, (UNFCCC, 2010a). 
      
5.3.1 Procedural conduction of negotiation texts  
”Texts do not only reflect the status of negotiations, but can also help move the 
process forward” (Depledge, 2005, p. 164). Text can move the negotiations 
forward through, (i) it makes progress in bargaining ”real” and (ii) texts can 
facilitate more efficient negotiations, through its ability to capture all the details 
and thereby allow actors to focus on the big issues. In sum, the process manager’s 
procedural conduction of negotiation texts plays a crucial role in an efficient 
organizational process.  
5.3.1.1 Conference of Parties 15 – Copenhagen Climate Conference  
 
When almost two hundred countries, each with numerous of stakeholders and 
voters to consent, trying to construct an agreement together: the text they are 
working on easily grows to become ungraspable. At one of the preparatory 
negotiation sessions in 2009 the chair, of the working group that tried to reach a 
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long-term agreement for all parties (AWG-LCA), proposed a text consisting of 
only 53 pages (UNFCCC, 2009e). When this negotiating text was opened up to 
the negotiating parties it quickly grew to a total of 199 pages (UNFCCC, 2009b). 
Consequently, many delegations did not have sufficient time to reflect on it or to 
coordinate common positions (ENB, 2009a, p. 23).   
In order to move closer to a real agreement, the Danish organization started to 
work on a text, commonly referred to as the Danish text. The idea to develop a 
Danish proposal before the conference had been settled by the Prime Minister’s 
office, despite warnings from UNFCCC and the Ministry of Environment 
(Meilgaard, 2010, p. 124). The text was developed through consultations with key 
actors, but the “secret” text was leaked to the newspaper The Guardian on the 8 of 
December19 (ENB, 2009f, p. 4). The leaked text was an early version and was 
generally perceived skewed towards the interests of the United States. A reason 
for this was that “it was first debated with the Americans, then with other 
countries and that’s why the version that was leaked was more based on inputs 
from the Americans than from developing countries”20. This move by the 
president was deemed un-transparent and not a suitable move for the president, 
who is supposed to represent the interests of all parties.   
The leakage resulted in that many developing parties distrusted the 
organizational process. Another result was that “it alienated a lot of countries that 
were interested in an agreement”21 and that “many developing countries felt left 
out”22. Connie Hedegaard, the initial COP president, said after the conference on 
the implications of the Danish text ”It takes years to build confidence. It takes 
hours to destroy it” (Hedegaard in Meilgaard, 2010a, p. 129). The UNFCCC 
executive secretary said, “The Danish paper presented at an informal meeting a 
week before the COP destroyed two years of effort in one fell swoop” (de Boer in 
Meilgaard, 2010a, p. 293). Callesen (2010, p. 247-248), who were in favor of the 
creation of a text, argues that the Danish organization should have released the 
full text to all countries immediately after the leak, in order to regain some trust 
                                                
19 Link to the original article: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-
summit-disarray-danish-text  
20 Interview – Negotiator1  
21 Interview – Negotiator1 
22 Interview – Negotiator1 
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and legitimacy. In other words, a more transparent process would have mitigated 
some of the damage that the text caused.  
The debacle, with the initial Danish text, made it hard for the process managers 
to push for progress through a new negotiation text. At the opening of the high-
level segment the new COP president Rasmussen said, “the Presidency intends to 
table its proposal for the outcome of the conference. It consists of two texts that 
are based substantially on the two texts forwarded by the AWGs. The proposal 
will be available shortly” 23. This action by the Danish organization immediately 
revoked anger among the developing countries. Brazil immediately raised a “point 
of order”, questioning especially Rasmussen’s earlier references to a new text 
based on the work in the two negotiation groups. Brazil said, 
“The Parties negotiated yesterday into the early morning a text under the AWG-LCA, and 
all of the Parties understands that this is the text that will guide us forward. So the idea 
that text that is new has been prepared covering (AWG-) LCA and (AWG-) KP issues, and 
that the discussion will be how to take the work forward on the basis of this new text, 
creates the clear indication that these negotiated by Parties texts are not the references 
for our work. That is a concern”24 
India recalled that the process must be inclusive, transparent and party driven25. 
China warned for the consequences that a “text from the sky” could have and 
emphasized that it displayed a “lack of respect”26. South Africa also questioned 
the legitimacy of an external text27. The procedural critique made by the BASIC 
countries was further repeated by many developing countries such as the 
Maldives, Sudan, Ecuador and Bolivia (ENB, 2009). Most developing countries 
were reluctant to allow the Danish organization developed a new negotiation text. 
This was much due to the low level of trust.  
On the 17 of December, just one day before the conference was supposed to 
close the Danish organization gave up their attempts to implement a new text, 
stating that the text that will be used is the one presented by the chairs of the 
negotiation groups (Müller, 2010, p. 12). The draft outcomes, which were put 
forward by the working groups, were far from ready to be implemented by the 
                                                
23 UNFCCC (2009a) Opening of High Level Segment (00:30) – Opening by the new COP president Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen  
24 UNFCCC (2009a) Opening of High Level Segment (01:00) – Point of order from Brazil  
25 UNFCCC (2009a) Opening of High Level Segment (07:30) – Point of order from India 
26 UNFCCC (2009a) Opening of High Level Segment (05:00) - Point of order from China 
27 UNFCCC (2009a) Opening of High Level Segment (22:00) – Point of order from South Africa 
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lead negotiators, which was the initial idea. This section on transparency, of 
mitigation by developing parties, reveals much of the problem. Every bracket is 
an unsolved formulation.  
Information on [planned and implemented] mitigation actions of developing 
country Parties shall be provided through national communications and 
shall be [assessed at the national level] [considered in a 
[review][consultative] process under the Convention]   
       
(UNFCCC, 2009c, p. 7)  
 
The lack of transparency, and in extension the low level of trust, in the 
organizational process, made it impossible for the process managers to implement 
a new text. This was considered “fatal” for the conference (Callesen, 2010, p. 
246). Lack of progress in the negotiations and the reluctance to a new chair’s text 
forced a closed, un-transparent, meeting in which the Copenhagen Accord was 
shaped. If the process had been more transparent, from the start, the level of trust 
would have been higher and the chances would be better for the agreement to pass 
the plenary.  
5.3.1.2 Conference of Parties 16 – Cancun Climate Conference 
The first time, the negotiators meet after the conference in Copenhagen was in 
Bonn, just four months later. Tense discussions were held regarding how to view 
the Copenhagen Accord: some parties argued that just a few parties had developed 
it and emphasized that it had not passed the plenary. Many parties stressed that the 
process in Copenhagen “had not been legitimate”. In the working group 
negotiating commitments for all parties, tense discussions were held regarding if 
they should give the chair mandate to prepare a new negotiation text, from which 
the parties could start to negotiate. Parties finally agreed to give the chair mandate 
to draft a new text based on the texts that had been discussed in Copenhagen 
(ENB, 2010a). These tense discussions reveal how disappointed parties were of 
the process and outcome in Copenhagen. It also displays the importance of 
negotiation texts.  
The last preparatory session was held in Tianjin, China, in October 2010.  
During 2010, parties had tried to produce two texts, which should be the 
foundation for an agreement in Cancun. Just as had happened before the 
conference in Copenhagen, the texts grow to become ungraspable (ENB, 2010, 
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p.1). The text, produced by the working group on the long-term action by all 
parties forwarded, comprised 70 pages with numerous of brackets (UNFCCC, 
2010b). The conference in Cancun met the same challenges as the process had 
done one year earlier, with unfinished texts including vast differences. 
However, the organizational strategy in Cancun was different. Espinosa 
constantly reassured the negotiators that no secret texts would suddenly appear 
and trump the work of the negotiators (ENB, 2010, p. 28). The Mexican 
succeeded to convince the negotiators that no secret text would appear and that 
the agreement would reflect the work done by the negotiators. This “basis of 
trust” was a key reason to why the Cancun Agreements passed the plenary 
(Morgan, 2010). 
The final document, what became the Cancun Agreement, was however not 
negotiated by the parties, but compiled by the Mexican organization, with the help 
from a hand full of parties (Khor, 2011, p. 12 – Bielke, 2011). This text was 
presented to the parties on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (excluding any possibilities 
of amendments) just hours before the conference closed (Khor, 2011). Despite the 
un-transparent finale, the organizational process successfully balanced 
transparency and effectiveness in the organizational process. The feeling of trust 
and transparency, together with a balanced document with something for all key 
parties (Morgan, 2010) made this final move possible for the Mexicans. In other 
words, the parties had been in the loop during the whole conference and felt that 
their views had been included in the final agreement. The Mexican organization 
had seen what happened in Copenhagen and constantly reassured the parties that 
the conference would be transparent and inclusive, a strategy that paid off.  
 In contrast, the lack of progress in Copenhagen and the inability of the 
process managers to push trough a new negotiation text forced the presidency to 
go with “plan c” (Meilgaard, 2010) and propose a ”friends of the chair” group. 
This meeting, chaired by the Danish organization, was unable to develop a 
comprehensive text, which in turn prompted a small negotiation with just the 
United States and the BASIC countries to produce a text, what later became the 
Copenhagen Accord. An initial negotiation text consisting of over 200 pages and 
two years of negotiations was scrapped for an accord consisting of barely three 
pages (UNFCCC, 2009d). Transparency of the actions, by the organization in 
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Cancun, successfully generated a satisfactory level of trust, which made it 
possible for the process managers to push trough the Cancun Agreements.  
5.3.2 Procedural selection of negotiation forums 
Small group negotiations are a necessary tool forum for constructive discussions. 
Negotiations in the plenary can be very time-consuming and rarely productive. 
However, the process managers must be able to balance the effectiveness of small 
group negotiations with the perception of transparency and legitimacy.    
5.3.2.1 Conference of Parties 15 – Copenhagen Climate Conference 
If the procedural development of the Copenhagen Accord had been transparent 
enough, was the subject of a fierce debate in the final day of the 15th Conference 
of Parties (ENB, 2009, p. 28). Due to the inadequate progress during the two 
weeks of negotiations in Copenhagen, a ”friends of the chair” consultation 
consisting of 26 parties were initiated by the Danish government and supported by 
most parties (ENB, 2009, p.28). This small group negotiation was managed by the 
Danish organization and was not perceived to be transparent by the excluded 
parties, “The other parties did not even know what was going on” (negotiator in 
Monheim, 2011, p. 153). The exceptional dynamics, that the number of world 
leaders and high expectations had engendered, prompt an even smaller group to 
negotiate the content of the Copenhagen Accord. This group consisted of the 
United States and the BASIC group (Monheim, 2013 – Meilstrup, 2010). The 
president of the United States immediately announced the existence of an 
agreement to the media, which resulted in that many negotiators found out of it 
through this channel (ENB, 2009, p. 28). This was symptomatic for the level of 
transparency at the conference.  
 The deadlock in the negotiation process, during the whole Copenhagen 
conference, forced the process managers to propose small group negotiations. 
These are generally more popular by developed and influential parties, while 
many developing countries fear of missing out. When the parties are negotiating 
in the plenary just 43 out of 194 parties are included in the Annex I28 but when the 
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26 parties29 (Dimitrov, 809) were negotiating in the ”friends of the chair” meeting, 
ten countries were Annex I parties. Depledge (2005, p. 113) writes that ”the key to 
the acceptability and effectiveness of informal arenas therefore lies in their careful 
management”. ”Friends of the chair” negotiations are only open to the parties that 
have been invited by the chair and what they might gain in effectiveness they risk 
loose in transparency (Depledge and Chasek, 2012, p. 27). One group was not 
invited or informed about the events behind the closed doors and it should have 
big consequences for the final outcome.  
  The ALBA group, includes countries such as Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, demands climate equality and is skeptical of the 
“capitalistic system” (PWCCC, 2010). When they were excluded from the closed 
negotiations, without any insight, their low-level trust in the process and the 
negotiating parties became even lower. Some developing countries, “with 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua in the forefront, voiced strong objections 
to a un-transparent and undemocratic negotiating process and renounced the 
Copenhagen Accord” (ENB, 2009, p. 28), which made an agreement impossible 
due to the decision-making system based on consensus.  
5.3.2.2 Conference of Parties 16 – Cancun Climate Conference     
 
Small group negotiations were used in Cancun as well, the big difference was that 
they were open-ended: negotiators could come and go as they pleased. 
Negotiations during the 16th Conference of Parties were held in the plenary, 
contact groups, informal consultations and in bilateral meetings. However, the 
organizational process included regular stocktaking meetings where all parties 
were updated on progress in different forums (ENB, 2010, p. 1). Without secret 
negotiations, the perceived level of transparency and in extension trust within the 
negotiations increased.  
 What became the Cancun Agreements, was however negotiated between a 
handful of parties in a closed room, when just 36 hours remained of the 
conference. The Mexican organization quietly invited some key parties to a 
”friends of the chair” meeting. Important issues remained, such as how to get the 
                                                
29 United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Norway, Mexico, the Maldives, 
Lesotho, South Africa, Bangladesh, Algeria, Denmark, Germany, France, India, Ethiopia, Colombia, Korea, 
China, Brazil and the European Union 
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emerging economies of India, China and Brazil to comply with a transparency 
system, in which they must report emissions (Bialek, 2011). The COP president 
Espinosa “announced that a new draft decision text, prepared under her 
responsibility and reflecting parties” work under the AWG-LCA, had been 
distributed.” (ENB, 2010, p. 9). Much because, the whole conference had been 
perceived as transparent and fair, the negotiating parties tolerated this un-
transparent final move.  
A “handful” of parties wrote both the Cancun Agreement and the Copenhagen 
Accord. However, the processes leading up to these texts were different in terms 
of transparency, and this shaped the negotiators perception of the texts. The 
organizational process in Cancun was perceived to be transparent enough, which 
allowed the process managers to use a small negotiation group to produce the final 
agreement. The leak of the Danish text affected parties’ trust in the Danish 
organization, which made many developing parties opponents to any innovative 
idea that the Danish organization came up with. It would have been difficult for 
the organization in Copenhagen, to implement the same level of transparency as 
the Mexican organization did because of higher stakes and expectations. 
However, they could have been better at informing parties about progress and turn 
of events, which probably would have eased the level of distrust.  
5.3.3 Conclusions 
The perceived level of transparency was higher in Cancun than in Copenhagen. 
Monheim (2013) who focuses on the role of presidencies show that 75 % of the 
participants in Cancun thought the process was “adequately” transparent 
compared to 0 % in Copenhagen30. However, transparency is not just the task of 
the host government, but the whole organization. Figueres, UNFCCC Executive 
Secretary, had a key role in assisting the Mexicans and choosing right forums and 
by pairing negotiators (Araya, 2011). Not just the Danish leadership, but also the 
whole organization, including Ban ki-Moon, contributed to the hype and the high 
expectations that surrounded the Copenhagen conference, an interest that made a 
high level of transparency difficult.  
                                                
30 He bases his numbers on interviews with 31 and 39 participants.  
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It is also evident that the increased level of transparency in Mexico was not just 
the result of a smart organizational decision by the Mexican: it was an 
organizational decision made by the parties in April 2010. The negotiators agreed, 
a reaction to the un-transparent process in Copenhagen, “to continue to work in an 
inclusive and transparent manner that adheres to the principles of the United 
Nations” (UNFCCC, 2010b). As one secretariat said, “if you want everyone to 
agree you will need everyone's buy-in”31, it creates an agreement that “all parties 
can live with”32. In other words, the organizational process reacted to what 
happened in Copenhagen and revitalized the level of transparency in the working 
process.  
                                                
31 Interview – UNFCCC Secretariat1 
32 Interview – UNFCCC Secretariat1  
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6 Conclusions  
Multiple variables interact in a complicated process like climate negotiations, 
which make it impossible to predict exactly what the effect of an efficient process 
would have been. However, based on the qualitative comparison made of two 
conferences: I will claim that the organizational process had an effect on the 
outcome both in Copenhagen and Cancun. If either of these three mechanisms 
were in favor of an outcome in Copenhagen, the probability would have been 
higher: (i) if the organizational culture was intact and the negotiators consequently 
could follow routines and thus feel confident in their and other actor’s actions, (ii) 
if the alignment between the process managers had created a smooth and efficient 
process and (iii) if the organizational process successfully had balanced 
transparency and efficiency. In Cancun, this was very much the case, if it had not 
been the chances of a successful agreement would have been slim.  
What is referred to, as the organizational culture is the notion that actors in the 
UNFCCC process have their own rules, routines and norms: a certain way of 
doing things. A core assumption, extracted from theories on organizational 
cultures, is that it enhances procedural efficiency in the short run: continuity and a 
low level of uncertainty enable actors to focus on the essential issues. The analysis 
shows that the organizational culture was altered in Copenhagen, which increased 
the level of uncertainty among the participants. This uncertainty probably gets 
even bigger in a multilateral process, where every participant must report back to 
their own organization, or at least make a new assessment of the implications 
based on shifting circumstances. Cancun was a ”normal working COP”33 with a 
very able host country, which paved the way for a more efficient working process. 
 Alignment between the top process managers is a key to a smooth process. High 
stakes, both before and during the conference in Copenhagen, spurred divisional 
conflicts. Actors saw this critical conference from their own position in the 
organization. The Prime Minister’s office pushed their ideas through, despite 
                                                
33 Interview, Negotiator1 
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warnings from other divisions within the Danish organization and the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. From the Prime Minister’s position, which was bounded by a limited 
understanding of the UNFCCC process, the best way to an agreement was to 
engage with the most powerful leaders directly, with the assumption that the rest 
would follow. This became not the case, instead it spawned distrust among the 
developing countries, which made the Danish leadership contested and conflicted. 
The Mexicans were better aligned internally and with the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
This alignment fostered both a well thought out diplomatic strategy and a high 
level of expertise, which generated both a smooth process and a higher level of 
trust. 
 The importance of transparency was revitalized after the conference in 
Copenhagen. Lack of transparency had engendered distrust in Copenhagen: the 
parties were never sure if secret negotiations were occurring, if so, what happened 
in these and should the presidency try to implement a new ”text from the sky”. 
Except distrust, the lack of transparency also led to many time-consuming 
instances. After the conference in Copenhagen, the whole organization realized 
that transparency was a central part of the process and it became a cornerstone of 
the Mexican presidency. With open-ended negotiation forums and recurrent 
stocktaking meetings, the necessary level of trust was generated, which enabled 
the process managers to push through the Cancun Agreements.      
This thesis has also shown that an extended version of Allison’s Organizational 
Process Model can be useful for analysis of different types of decision-making 
processes. However, a multilateral negotiation cannot maximize efficiency in the 
same way as an organization can: efficiency must always be balanced with 
transparency in order to move the negotiations forward in a legitimate way. Other 
variables could also have been interesting to include, such as inclusiveness. 
Another possible improvement, of this approach, could be to analyze key actor’s 
behavior from an organizational perspective. In this thesis, it is only assumed that 
governments act as organizations. A further step would be to analyze countries’ 
internal decision-making processes: something that would require more time and 
resources. Applying an organizational perspective on new types of decision-
making processes can help us to better grasp the underlying mechanisms in place. 
I, therefore, encourage scholars to use, and further develop, these theories and 
apply them on new cases and regimes.  
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